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Above: T heodore C. Steele, American 1847-1926,
Summer Landscape, 1899, oil on canvas, 22 x 29 inches. Private Collection.
Cover: Theodore C. Steele, American 1847-1926,
Hill Forest-Winter Morning, 1912, oil on canvas, 22
x 29 inches. Private Collection.
These two paintings were on view in October at
Valparaiso University as part of a special loan
exhibit celebrating the achievements of the pioneer
Indiana Impressionist painter, T. C. Steele. Included were examples of his dark Munich-manner
landscapes as well as the brighter Brown County
paintings.
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IN LUCE TUA
C omment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
Compassion, Truth, and AIDS
When Christians start to talk about AIDS, they
rightly begin with expressions of compassion for its
victims. So charity requires. This modern scourge
takes its toll in terrible ways, and those who suffer
from the disease (as well as their families) deserve our
compassionate attention and our sympathy. We must
attend to them and wait and endure with them; it is
intolerable that those facing inevitable and often
agonizing death should have their misery compounded
by ostracism, indifference, or moralizing condemnation. One can only be appalled at the images of God
that must be present in the minds of those who would
presume to see the disease as an act of divine retribution for immoral behavior.
At a more public level, Christians-with other citizens of good will-should be active in encouraging
government to act with utmost urgency to fund the research necessary to find an AIDS cure. Even from a
vantage point of lay ignorance we recognize the extraordinary complexities that attend that search and
we are aware as well that the research community cannot usefully absorb and allocate unlimited resources
for any one project at any one time, but the critical nature of the situation dictates that we not let normally
justified concern over waste hinder the search for an
early scientific breakthrough, however long we know
the odds against such a breakthrough to be.
In addition to the imperatives of personal compassion and public generosity, it is important to encourage a mood of sobriety, careful analysis, and steadiness
of view as society addresses itself to the difficult social
questions associated with the AIDS epidemic. That's
unfortunately easier prescribed than practiced. Complaints of public "hysteria" on matters surrounding the
AIDS issue have become almost as common as alarms
concerning the disease itself. The problem is that the
purported hysteria is so ill-defined, or is defined in
such contradictory ways, that we are left uncertain as
to just how we might go about maintaining our proper
non-hysterical equilibrium. But sober truthtellers we
ought nonetheless try to be, even if truths about AIDS
are notably difficult to sort out and isolate.
The complexities begin with defining the population
that is at risk of infection from the AIDS virus. Is
AIDS primarily a "gay disease"-with significant secondary target groups among hemophiliacs and intravenous (IV) drug users sharing contaminated needles--or is its present concentration in such groups an
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epidemiological fluke that will soon be superseded by
a general "breakout" into the larger heterosexual
population? The answer to this question is critical in
assessing the danger of the epidemic to the public
health of the nation. A disease largely restricted to
homosexuals, hemophiliacs, and IV drug abusers remains a terrible and immediate problem for those within
those populations--one that of course requires a sense
of urgency among all of us to combat-but it does not
take on the plague-like implications for the population
as a whole that many have feared and anticipated.
Talk of a general breakout ("everyone is at risk")
has been widespread not only in the popular media
but among key personnel in the public health community, including most particularly the Surgeon General
of the United States, C. Everett Koop, who has argued
that AIDS is "exploding" into the heterosexual population. But now along comes a report in the November
Commentary by Michael A. Fumento, "AIDS: Are
Heterosexuals at Risk?" which argues persuasively that
not only has such a breakout not yet occurred or begun
to occur but that there is very little likelihood of anything like it happening in the foreseeable future. If
Fumento is right-and we urge all interested parties to
check his arguments for themselves-then a considerable part of our public conversation concerning AIDS
needs to be re-evaluated and probably revised.
According to Fumento, the presumed recent increase in the incidence of AIDS among heterosexuals
is a statistical artifact occasioned by dubious rearranging of categories by the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) and the fear of an AIDS breakout a subsequent
false extrapolation from those jumbled figures. In fact,
he insists, the evidence available indicates that the
population substantially at risk of contracting AIDS remains what it has always been-gays, IV drug users,
hemophiliacs, and those who are regular sex partners
of individuals within those categories.
Why the unlikelihood of breakout? Because,
Fumento says, AIDS is "extraordinarily difficult" to
transmit or contract. Unlike other sexually-transmitted
diseases-syphillis, gonorrhea, herpes-AIDS is essentially blood-borne and cannot be transmitted simply by
the juxtaposition of genitalia. It is not at all easily
passed through vaginal intercourse, especially from
women to men, and it is this fundamental difficulty of
transmission that secures the protection of the
heterosexual population. There is no good evidence to
lead us to expect, Fumento says, a general breakout of
AIDS from the present at-risk groups to the hetero-
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sexual community through secondary and tertiary transmission, although isolated cases will continue to occur.
The sexual transmission of AIDS, according to
Fumento's-and others'-reading of the medical evidence, is overwhelmingly by anal intercourse; the predominant risk factor in the disease is engagement in
receptive anal sex. While the vagina is protected by
strong platelike cells that are not easily penetrated and
that resist infectious agents, the tissue in the rectum is
composed mainly of columnar cells that readily rupture and tear. Thus in anal sex semen has easy access
to blood vessels and thus the AIDS virus is most commonly transmitted. The risk factor is compounded by
the fact that the rectum, unlike the vagina, has little
natural lubrication, which increases the likelihood of
rupture . Even the ~se of condoms, which of course reduces the risk factor enormously, is less effective in
anal than vaginal intercourse because the lack of anal
lubrication means that the condom is more likely to
tear. "Safe sex," in other words, is more difficult to
achieve in homosexual than heterosexual relations.
What increases the danger of AIDS even further
among homosexuals is the promiscuity common
among many of them. (Promiscuity is hardly unknown
among heterosexuals, of course, but the available evidence indicates that its incidence is significantly higher
among gays.) The more sexual encounters one engages in, the higher the likelihood of contracting the
disease. Fumento cites a 1981 CDC study of homosexual AIDS victims that found that they had averaged 61
different sex partners a year.
All this suggests, Fumento concludes, that a truly
honest and effective education program to arrest the
spread of the disease will have to be far more specific
and focused than has been the case to date: "Every
dollar spent, every commercial made , every health
warning released , that does not specify promiscuous
anal intercourse and needle-sharing as the overwhelming risk factors in the transmission of AIDS is a lie, a
waste of funds and energy, and a cruel diversion ."
If Fumento's case concerning the nature of AIDS
transmission and the relative safety of heterosexuals
from that transmission is sound, what explains the
large amount of public comment to the contrary?
Ignorance, partly, a good portion of it understandable; AIDS, after all , is a recent phenomenon, and we
are even yet in the learning state concerning many aspects of it. Prudence as well , particularly, one suspects,
among public health officials; since there's a lot about
the disease we don't yet know, since it is at least conceivable that heterosexuals might yet turn out to be
widely at risk, it might be the wiser course to assume
a worst-case scenario and protect against it.
But there would seem to be other factors at work in
4

the evasive, even misleading way our public conversation about AIDS has sometimes been conducted. One
would be the laudable desire to avoid having the AIDS
debate turn into an occasion for gay-bashing. If the
discussion of the disease focuses explicitly on certain
sexual practices more prevalent in the gay community
than outside of it, then it allows for the further stigmatizing of homosexuality as an enemy of the public
good . A related consideration involves the mustering
of public support for the allocation of financial and
other resources to meet the AIDS challenge. One suspects that many public health officers and gay activists
fear that emphasis on the gay-related aspects of the
disease will make the rallying of the necessary support
to fight AIDS more difficult (or, to put the matter in
a more charitable light, the more widespread the
AIDS threat is perceived to be, the more likely the
possibility of forging a public consensus to combat it.)
Those concerns are entirely understandable. The
discussion of the AIDS threat must remain resolutely
focused on its public health aspects; concern over the
practice of anal sex in this context must focus on the
health questions involved, not on anyone's moral ,
esthetic, or other views on the practice or on those
who engage in it. The message here must be that
promiscuous anal sex can kiU you , not that it is bad for
your soul (though promiscuity of any kind most certainly is). Those in the Christian community who see
homosexual behavior as a violation of the divine or
natural order or who for whatever reason question its
sanctioning in law have nonetheless a moral duty not
to let those objections and reservations interfere with
their zeal in seeing that the scourge of AIDS be overcome. In talking about AIDS, consideration of
homosexuality qua homosexuality must be laid aside.
At the same time, however, elements of equivocation
and evasion, however innocent the motives behind
them, should not be allowed to corrupt the conduct of
public policy debate. With respect to AIDS,
generalized admonitions to the public to indulge only
in "safe sex" or intimations that heterosexuals are as
likely as gays to be at risk obscure the truth and make
more difficult a concerted attack on the disease.
Besides which, promulgation of a myth of widespread heterosexual susceptibility to AIDS must
sooner or later be found out. What sort of reaction
can we expect, Fumento asks, when a few years down
the road people begin to notice that heterosexuals are
not getting the disease and they catch on that the general public has been duped into an unnecessary panic?
Then we will likely learn what we should have known
all along: that the most responsible policy for AIDS
would have been to tell the fullest known truth from
the beginning.
C:
The Cresset

Constance Gengenbach

THE SECUlARIZATION OF VOCATION
AND THE WORSHIP OF WORK
Reflections on the Meaning of Christian Vocation

(Editor's Note: This is the first part of a two-part essay.)

Today's college students and faculty have many confused associations with the term vocation. Imagine a
group of them trying to define the term.
At a church college someone would surely mention
the Christian vocation. One is called by God, so vocation must be a good thing. But called exactly to what?
A student might comment that vocation has to do with
work, perhaps a life's work, the academic vocation.
This topic I will take up in the second part of this
essay.
Our imaginary college might have at least one secularist, who would point out that many people have
lived lives which could be defined as callings. They
have helped the world, or pursued knowledge, and all
the while explicitly denied the name of a Caller. The
secularist might mention the vision of calling in artists
such as Camus or Thomas Mann, the academic calling
in Max Weber, the priesthood of music claimed by
Wagner, and the healing role claimed for psychoanalysis by Freud.
Here an intrepid defender of the liberal arts might
interrupt, and change the subject entirely, to bewail
the dangers of vocationalism-mere technical training
directed toward marketability, destructive of the true
ends of higher education. S/he might indignantly point
out that such training is not vocation at all, but a corruption of language revealing the unfortunate secularization undergone by the term. Speakers for
Christian vocation might agree, and identify secularization as the evil force that would allow God's call to

Constance Gengenbach completed this essay shortly beJure her death from cancer in early September at the age of
42. She was Associate Professor of History and Senior Tutor
of the Paracollege at St. Olaf College.
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degenerate into Camus' practice of literary art, or
Freud's psychoanalysis.

History, according to one definition,
is "all the parts you can remember,
including one hundred and three good
things," a few bad ones, and two
genuine dates. For many people,
secularization clearly belongs in
the category of "bad things."

History, according to one definition, is "all the parts
you can remember, including one hundred and three
good things," a few bad ones, and two genuine dates.'
According to the participants in this imaginary conversation, secularization could clearly be added to the category of "bad things." But has the secularization of the
Christian concept of vocation really been an unfortunate development in Western history? It is my contention that it has not. Rather, the secularization of the
concept of calling has allowed Christians a more vivid
experience of the meaning of God's Grace and Judgment within human life. The seculum, or this age, can
never simply be dismissed as worldly and evil because
for Christians, as Martin Marty has so eloquently asserted, "this age is still something that unfolds under
the creative and governing power of God. And though
the demonic may be present in it, this world is also
God's world." 2 It is God's creation, and in it he became
and becomes flesh.
What then is Christian vocation and how has sec'Paraphrased from W. C. Sellar and R. J. Yeatman, 1066
and All That (New York, 1931).
•Martin Marty, Being Good and Doing Good (Philadelphia,
1984), p. 117.
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ularization affected it? At the outset I should say that
I realize defining Christian vocation properly requires
a vast amount of exegesis, and a fully developed doctrine of the church, of the ordained m inistry, and of
all of ethics. There is indeed bountiful wealth here for
the theologian, but embarrassment and some terror
for the historian. So I will try to serve up the pie of
Christian vocation historically rather than theologically, by tracing the original meaning of the term and
what happened to it as it encountered the changing
circumstances of several centuries. Since it will be impossible to avoid theological issues completely, I must
confess in advance that I will wander through that
garden not as a systematic reaper, but simply to pick
a few flowers that attract my eye.
How was the biblical concept of calling transformed
into worldly work? Considerable attention has been
devoted to this subject since German sociologist Max
Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
exploded on the scholarly scene in essay form in
1904. 3 Weber identified the Reformation concept of
divine or godly vocation in the world-especially in its
Calvinist variation-as a primary contributor to the
western mentality that created capitalism. He also
noted the difference between this usage of the term
and both biblical and medieval uses, and saw the Ref-

ormation concept as a more secularized version of calling.•
While compared to most medieval notions the Reformation did represent a secularization of vocation,
that secularization helped to recapture the vivid incarnational quality present in the biblical use of the term.
In both Old and New Testament, God's call is by
Grace and to Grace, a call to share in his blessings." It
is not a call out of the world, but an encounter with
God and his purposes in the world. The Old Testament shows this dimension most richly, because it covers a period of a thousand years, and shows the covenant people as they lived out their faith in the context
of their culture.6

' In quick succession thereafter followed the work of Ernst
Troeltsch, Social Teachings of the Ch1istian Churches ( 1911 ),
Protestantism and Progress (1912), and R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism ( 1921 ). Karl HoB and others
replied hotly to what were viewed as hostile attacks and
distortions of Luther. See "Das Neubau der Sittlichkeit"
and "Die Geschichte des Wortes Beruf," for example, in
Holl's Gesammelte Aufsiitze, or Gustav Wingren's Luther on
Vocation . The events of World War II, and presumably
conclusions drawn therefrom about Lutheran social and
political ethics, drew a spate of reexaminations of vocation in the context of social ethics. See H. Richard
Niebuhr, Christ and Culture ( 1951) and George Forell,
Faith Active in Love ( 1954 ). Accelerated mechanization and
economic change caused special concerns in the study department of the World Council of Churches about the
world of work , and this generated a number of considerations of vocation in the 1940s and 1950s, including symposia edited by john Oliver Nelson, Work and Vocation
(1954) and W. R. Forrster, Christian Vocation (1953), and
Donald R. Heiges' book The Christian's Calling (1958). In
our era of unemployment the problem is not going away
either-most recent are George Fore11 and Wi11iam
Lazareth, eds., Work as Praise ( 1979), the Concilium volume edited by Gregory Baum, Work and Religion ( 1980),
Dorothy Soe1le's To Work and To Love: A Theology of Creation ( 1984), and Paul G. Johnson, Grace: God's Work Ethic
(1985). Word and World devoted its Spring, 1984 issue to
working. Vocation is also a crucial element in Robert Bellah's recent book, Habits of the Hearl (1985).

In the Old Testament, calling is self-disclosure on
God's part, and the human response is obedience. The
call is corporate, addressed to all Israel, but obedience
is individual. To be obedient to God's call means to
show forth justice and bear his light to all nations.
(Is. 45:22, 42:4, 49:3-6) It may be that the word obedience is insufficient because it is predicated on a
culture-bound, patriarchal vision of a God who is external to creation and unrelated to his creatures. If so,
one could describe the appropriate human response to
God's call not as obedience to authority but cooperation . Through the willing use of life and work to
achieve those same ends of bringing forth peace and
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In the Old Testament, calling is
self-disclosure on God's part, and
the human response is obedience. The
call is corporate, addressed to all
Israel , but obedience is individual.
To be obedient means to show forth
justice and bear God's light to all.

•Weber, Protestant Ethic (New York, 1958), pp. 80-86.
Weber tends to misinterpret Luther in a dualist direction,
claiming that for him calling was a fulfillment of worldly
obligations of work only, and was separate from Christian
ca11ing.
''Gerhard Kittel, ed. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromily, III, pp. 488, 491.
"Claus Westermann, "Work, Civilization, and Culture in
the Bible," in Concilium: Work and Religion (Nijmwegen,
Edinburgh, and New York, 1980), p. 81. For what follows
see also Paul S. Minear, "Work and Vocation in Scripture," in Nelson, ed., Work and Vocation; and Foster R.
McCurley and John H. Reumann, "Work in the Providence of God," in Forell and Lazareth, eds., Work as
Praise.
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justice, one can partiCipate m the world as a creature
truly in God 's image. 7 In either case, however, response to the call is in the activities of everyday life,
work among them.
In the Old Testament, calling is not completely
separate from work, nor is it submerged in it. God's
call includes the whole of Israel's life-work, leisure,
and worship. Claus Westermann points out that the
Hebrew word used in the Genesis charge to "cultivate
the earth" gradually came to have a much broader
meaning, of serving God , and even of worship, or
cult. 8
Response to God's call is therefore within and
through life, including work. Calling touches not just
some work, but all kinds. There are special religious
callings of particular individuals (Abraham, Joseph ,
Moses, the prophets) but they function as part of the
covenant with the whole people, and never are their
professions distinguished from other kinds of work.
Nor does the Bible give evidence of a distinction between manual and mental labor. Meaning in work depends on the purpose in the worker's life-on his calling-rather than on the kind of work, its social utility ,
or the quality of the achievement. "Unless the Lord
builds the house, those who build it labor in vain" (Ps.
127:I). Neither is work an absolute value in the Old
Testament. The commandment to rest on the seventh
day points beyond work "to the whole of human life,
whose goal is not the performance of work, but something beyond that."9 The purpose of the whole, both
work and rest, is the enjoyment of God's promised
blessings.
In the New Testament, the figure of Jesus can be
seen as the representation of perfect vocation in the
Old Testament sense, in that he was fully aware of the
central purpose of life and perfectly faithful to it. The
life and death of Jesus also seals the promise implicit
in the Old Testament, that God comes to us incarnate
within the world. In his epistles, Paul continues the
Old Testament usage of calling (klesis) by seeing it as
both a summons of the community and as God's election or choosing of each believer. The calling is to
faith in the promises of God in Jesus; it is questionable
whether Paul in I Cor. 7:20 added earthly station to
the meaning of vocation. This is more likely to have
been Luther's innovation in translating the passage. 10
The New Testament is so focused on the message
about Christ and about the first century of the
church's existence that it is left to the rest of church
history, our own age included, to work out the full im7Soelle, To Work and To Love, pp. 17, 66.
"Westermann, p. 82.
9
/bid. , p. 90.
'°Kittel, pp. 492-93.
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plications of the relationship of Christ's call to discipleship with work and daily life. Clear indications are
given in the New Testament, however. Especially in
his parables Jesus weaves the call to repentance and
salvation into the whole fabric of everyday life. Claus
Westermann says of the parables,
It is only when we see these against the background of
the similes, metaphors, and comparative aphorisms in
the Old Testament that it becomes clear that they deal
very largely with what we call civilization and culture.
Jesus' parables show a keen appreciation of this part of
life. The correspondence between different things
which is expressed here means that man's labour and
his civilization and culture are included when we talk
about God's activity. In this way Jesus includes these aspects of life in the total happening between God and
man, the Creator and his creation."
If man's work is part of "the total happening between God and man" to which the New Testament testifies, this is not by any means the whole story about
work. Both New and Old are rich in warnings about
excessive focus on human earthly activity.' 2 Perhaps
most notable in the New Testament is the story where
Jesus berates the rich farmer (Luke 12: 13-4I) for
thinking that work well done is sufficient for human
beings. The oft-quoted injunction to "consider the
lilies of the field" in the Sermon on the Mount bears
the same message. The Old Testament story of the
Tower of Babel is a model of warning against overvaluing human achievements.
What then is the verdict about calling in the Bible
and its relationship to work? Calling is clearly to salvation and to the proclamation of the promises of God,
but it takes shape in human lives as they are lived, including human work. Eastern Christianity seems to
have grasped this biblical vision better than the West.
According to Gregory of Nyssa, man is a being with a
special "vocation to spread the Grace of God through
the whole creation, animate and inanimate." 13
In the Western church 14 the definitions of calling as
God's summons and election were maintained and
even extended in infant baptism to those not actively
receiving the call. But the sense of living out the call
in daily life was almost entirely collapsed into monasticism. Although there was an occasional intimation that
the believer must recognize God's presence in daily life
and work, this was not called vocation. Instead, voca"Westermann, pp. 87-88.
12
lbid., pp. 90, 84.
" Paulos Gregorios, The Human Presence.
14
For the early church and Middle Ages see Robert R.
Calhoun, "Work & Vocation in Christian History," m
Nelson, ed., Work and Vocation.
7

tion was identified with the decision to seek "Christian
perfection" through poverty, celibacy, and the contemplative life. The lives of Augustine and his friends
as seen in the Confessions attest to this equation. When
they experienced the call of God, it meant that they
had to leave "worldly" occupations, wife and family,
and if they were unable to do so, it was a cause of terrible sadness for them and an experience of what they
saw as sm.
Although work later played an important part in
most monastic rules, it was not primarily work which
connected monks to vocation, but rather their works
of the spirit-religious, observances, contemplation,
and the dedication of their lives to God. By the later
Middle Ages the very words vocatio and Ruf meant
only the official calling of a candidate to a clerical benefice by those who had power of ecclesiastical appointment. Christian vocation was thus split off from the
ordinary life of human beings in the world . Only in
the late Middle Ages with the rise of mysticism do we
see a reinstitution of the biblical notion of worldly
work as an arena for receiving and obeying the summons of God. Max Weber reports that Johannes
Tauter saw divine calling in all work, and even found
peasants spreading their fields with manure superior
in godliness to clergy who don't do their calling

do right, preserve peace, and wrong is done by no one?
... See, as no one is without some commission and calling, so no one is without some kind of work, if he desires to take heed to continue in his calling, look to himself, faithfully do what is commanded, and serve God
and keep his commandments; then he will have so
much to do that all time will be too short, all places too
cramped, all resources of help too weak.
The passage clearly indicates that work in the world
is not merely profane or secular. It is not an arena
from which God is absent, but the proper one in
which God is to be served. Not just high social status
but also work of all kinds is the appropriate context
for response to God's grace and forgiveness by service
to others. Again Luther:
If you are a manual laborer, you find that the Bible has
been put into your· workshop, into your hand, into your
heart. It teaches and preaches how you should treat
your neighbor. Just look at your tools-at your needle
or thimble, your beer barrel, your goods, your scales or
yardstick or measure-and you will read this statement
inscribed on them. Everywhere you look, it stares at
you. Nothing that you handle every day is so tiny that
it does not continually tell you this, if you will only listen. Indeed, there is no shortage of preaching. You have

as many preacheTS as you have transactions, goods, tools, and
other equipment in your house and home. All this is continually
crying out to you: "Friend, use me in your relations with your
neighbor just as you would want your neighbor to use his property in his relations with you. " 17

(Ru/). 15

The connection of vocation with labor and life in
the world becomes firmer with a pre-Reformation figure such as Wycliff, and especially with Luther and
whomever his reformation touches. Probably the
clearest passage is Luther's sermon on John 21:19-24. w
You may reply: But how if I am not called? Answer:
How is it possible that you are not called? You have always been in some state or station; you have always
been a husband or wife, a boy or girl, or servant. Picture before you the humblest state. Are you a husband ,
and you think you have not enough to do in that
sphere to govern your wife, children , domestics, and
property so that all may be obedient to God and you do
no one any wrong? .. . Again: Are you a son or daughter, and do you think you have not enough work with
yourself, to continue chaste, pure, and temperate during your youth, obey your parents, and offend no one
by word or deed? . .. Again: Are you a domestic servant, and do you think you would go idle if you were
to serve your lord or mistress with all faithfulness as
your station and orders require, and also keep your
mouth under control as with a bridle? ... And again:
Are you a prince, a lord, spiritual or secular-who has
more to do than you , in order that your subjects may
Tauler·, Sermon on Ephesians, cited in Weber, Th e Protestant Ethic, p. 208.
'"Luther, Church Postils, Gospel for the Day of St. John the
Evangelist, (Works, vol. 22).

15
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Luther's position does accommodate calling to the
secular dimension of everyday human life, and so "secularizes" vocation beyond what was the case in the
Middle Ages. Is this good or bad? It depends on how
one views the saeculurn, life in this world . If it is opposed to Christian life, the spirit and the achievement
of God's will, then secularization is clearly bad. If God
is incarnate in this world and works his ways within its
realities, the secularization of vocation is in fact good,
because it leads people back to the arena where God's
promise and his judgment can be encountered.
The difficulty with assessing the real value of
Luther's view of vocation is that his theology is neither
radically dualistic nor fully incarnational. The incarnational side of Luther's theology is to be found not only
in the vision of calling quoted above, but also with
great power elsewhere in his works. His delight in nature is such that he could scold Erasmus for his indifference to the sheer beauty of God's creation. His sermons on Christmas, baptism, and most of all his understanding of the Eucharist show deep appreciation
17
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of the way in which God's grace is to be found in,
with, and under the experiences and activities of ordinary human life.
Especially in his writings on education Luther is
quite explicit in affirming that the gifts of language,
reason, and song are from God, and that God expects
them to be used. "God will not perform miracles as
long as men can solve their problems by means of the
other gifts he has already given them." 18 Luther expects Christians to live their faith actively, and they
can be helped to such a life by this-world ly knowledge.
If children were instructed and trained in schools ...

they would hear of the doings and sayings of the entire
world, and how things went with various cities, kingdoms, princes, men and women. Thus they could in a
short time set before themselves as in a mirror the character, life, counsels, and purposes-successful and unsuccessful--of the whole world from the beginning; on
the basis of which they could then draw the proper inferences and in the fear of God take their own place in
the stream of human events. ' 9

thorities which also limited and commanded the way
the Christian responds to the love and fear of God in
daily life. Thus his incarnational view is tempered and
intermingled with strong language of dualism between
the Two Kingdoms. There is the left-hand Kingdom
of Law and the right-hand Kingdom of the Gospel,
but both are God's and He works in both. The orders
of creation (state, family, and church) provide structure and order in the left hand kingdom and operate
by coercion as a punishment and constraint for sin, yet
they are also God's good gifts to bless human life.
Work is the punishment for sin, but also a "mask" of
God through which we are blessed. Work is an avenue
for loving service to others, yet it comes in the shape
of obey! obey! obey! authorities at all levels of life.
Therefore God speaks to us and deals with us through
the ministers of the Word, through parents and
superiors, lest we be carried about by every wind of
doctrine . Let children listen to their parents, let the citizens listen to the magistrate, let the Christian listen to
the elder and the ministers of the Word, let the pupil
listen to the teacher. Outside of this Word all life is
damned and all conduct doomed. But if the Word is
present, I have sure consolation: whether I am a father,
mother, or son, I hear the word and I know what I
ought to believe and do, for God speaks to me in that
very station of life in which I happen to live! '

Luther's incarnational view of life
is tempered and intermingled with
strong language of dualism between
the Two Kingdoms. There is the left
hand Kingdom of Law and the right
hand Kingdom of the Gospel.
In his own proud but ironic relationship to his German heritage, Luther exhorts his people:
We have been German beasts all too long. Let us for
once make use of our reason , that God may perceive
our thankfulness for his benefits, and other nations see
that we too are human beings, able either to learn
something useful from others or to teach them in order
that even through us the world may be made better!"
These passages have in common the affirmation of
secular kn owledge and activity. God not only provides
the gifts but sets the context and standard for our
activity. It is typical of Luther to say "in the fear of
God," but we could also say in praise or love of God.
The warning against excessive investment in the wisdom or work of the world is in either case clear.
But Luther did not stop with such a warning. He
developed an elaborate structure of established au18Luther, To the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany That
Establish and Maintain Christian Schools (1524) Works, 44:356.
9
' /bid., 368-69.
20
/bid., 372.
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It is scarcely surprising that there has been lively
historical debate about whether Luther was a dualist.
The issues in this debate are interesting, and not irrevelant to our problem of vocation for the twentyfirst century. Of the dualists (Weber, Ernst Troeltsch,
a nd R. H. Tawney), Troeltsch is the most sophisticated. He claims that Luther froze vocation into the
public duties of one's social calling, to be called Christian not because of love or service but because of
obedience to God's Law expressed in the orders of
creation . "Increasingly the Lutheran ethic is summed
up in the following characteristic features: confidence
in God founded on his grace and the love of one's
neighbor, which is exercised in the social duties of
one's calling, combined with an obedient surrender to
the order of society . . . ." 22 The radical ethic of love
and service is confined, according to Troeltsch, to personal relationships; thus no demands for social change
or justice can be founded upon it. Tawney sums up
the dualists' position on Lutheran social ethics with the
statement that social policy was allocated to "that rare
'Luther, Works 43:8-15, quoted in Martin J. Heinecken ,
"Luther and the Orders of Creation in Relation to a Doctrine of Work and Vocation ," Lutheran Quarterly (1948).
22
T roeltsch, Social Teachings (New York, 1960), vol. II,
p. 509.
2
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monster, in the age of Machiavelli and He nry VIII,
the God-fearing prince." 23
Those who reject the dualists' arguments-from
Karl Ho11 and Gustav Wingren through George Forell,
Wi11iam Lazareth , and most modern Lutheran theologians-deny any inclination on Luther's part to a pply
the radical demands of love to only one part of existence and ignore the rest. Instead they see Luther's
d octrine of vocation as a radical reassertion of Christ
over culture within the field of daily work. "Luther insisted that God does not call you to do something but
to be something, a Christian servant. Every person has
an economic occupation, but the Christian views it as
part of h is/her religious vocation." 24 Despite this verdict, it is hard to hold on to an incarnational view of
vocation when reading Luther. It is too often overwhelmed by his dualistic language and the emphasis
on a uthority th at dominated the social world of which
he was a part.
T h is authoritarian social view dominated Lutheran
practice in the centuries after Luther. While
Lu theranism may have produced a sound evangelical
personal ethic, it produced no equivalent social ethic. 25
Patriarchy, authority, and public passivity became the
watchwords of orthodox Lutherans through the
nineteenth century. According to H . Richard Niebuhr,
Luther's answer to the Christ-and-culture question was
that of a dynamic, dialectical thinker. Its reproductions
by many who called themselves his followers were static
and undialectical. They substituted two parallel
moralities for his closely related ethics. As faith became
a matter of belief rather than the fundamental , trustful
orientation of the person in every moment toward God,
so the freedom of the Christian man became autonomy
in all the special spheres of culture. It is a great error
to confuse the parallelistic dualism of separated spiritual
and temporal life with the interactionism of Luther's
gospel of faith in Christ working by love in the world
of cu lture. 26
By separating the two kingdoms Lutherans hoped to
preserve the Gospel from corruption by earthly ambitions and concerns. In effect they only removed the
perspective of God's promises of wholeness, mercy,
peace, a nd justice from public life. When the temporal
kingdom is completely autonomous it is not trea ted incarnationally but ca rnally, where no aim or standard
' Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York,
I 926), p. 91.
2
' McCurley and Reumann, "Work in the Providence of
God ," in Forel l and Lazareth, eds., Work as Praise.
"'•Ibid., p. 53.
""H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York, 1951),
p. I 79.
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of aspiration is acknowledged beyond what is given in
the world itself. Thus for politics only the will of the
prince remains, and for work only the professional
standards of job performance or production.
This approach is unfortunately all too fami liar. A
recent article describes it as "limiting God's place in
the workplace to providing talents in the beginning
and the rewards at the end ." 27 According to George
Forell, it is "the belief that work itself is service to God
... that faithfulness in our job saves us, that the life
of Christian discipleship is achieved when we are good
shoemakers, good butchers, good teachers, good welders , good pastors, and last but by no means least, good
bankers."28

Lutherans are not responsible for the
final conversion of work as vocation
into work as worldly success.
Ironically it was not lutheran dualism
but the opposite stance in Calvinism
which effected the change.
Lutherans are not responsible for the final conversion of work as vocation into work as worldly success.
Ironically it was not Lutheran dualism but the opposite stance in Calvinism which effected the change.
The story is a complicated one, told brilliantly by Max
Weber and provided with ample evidence from among
seventeenth-century Puritan laymen by R. H. Tawney.
Simply stated, the concern of the Calvinist to find
signs of his election led to the formation of rigorous,
orderly, and moral habits of life, and also the inclination to see worldly success as a mark of divine favor.
As Weber puts it, "if the God whose hand the Puritan sees at work in all the occurrences of life shows to
one of his elect a chance of profit, he must do it with
a purpose. Hence the faithful Christian must follow
the call by taking advantage of the opportunity." 29
Worldly success and wealth therefore become both
marks of election and Christian duties. The poor, on
the other hand, were no longer God's special children
but both abandoned and derelict in their duty.
Paul G. Johnson, "Clairton, USA," The Christian Century,
102 Uuly 17-24, 1985).
2
"George Forell, "Work and the Christian Calling," Lutheran Quarterly ( 1948), p. 109.
29
Weber, Protestant Ethic, pp. I 76-177. Tawney has shown
convincingly that the change was carried out in the teeth
of the majority of Puritan clergy, who continued to condemn the active pursuit of wealth through interest on investment as the sin of usury.
27
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Weber's thesis was that both the inspiration to be
successful and the orderly and simple habits of life
rendered the Calvinist particularly suitable to create
the first rational capitalist economy. Over this claim
and over the role of socio-economic factors in general
in the Reformation , scholarly controversy still rages
eighty years later. However, this concerns us much less
than the portrait of work and its meaning that had developed among Protestants by the seventeenth century,
often in the teeth of opposition from their own clergy.
With the consciousness of standing in the fullness of
God's grace and being visibly blessed by Him , the
bourgeois business man , as long as he remained within
the bounds of formal correctness, as long as his moral
conduct was spotless and the use to which he put his interests was not objectionable, could follow his pecuniary
interests as he would and feel that he was fulfilling a
duty in doing so. It gave him the comforting assurance
that the unequal distribution of the goods of this world
was a special dispensation of Divine Providence, which
in these differences, as in particular grace, pursued secret ends unknown to men.30
Success or failure in the world had become a mark
of God's election or rejection , the wages of either
righteousness or sin. While God's seal was upon such
work, he did not become flesh and dwell in it. Instead
it was a "contraction of the territory in which the spirit
of religion was conceived to run."31 As the world of
work became completely material with little incarnational content, Christian calling again became identified with formally religious work.
Calling now belonged to the pastor, Luther's healthy
"secularization" of vocation was de facto reversed, and
the original biblical interplay between calling and work
was lost. Pietistic and evangelical revivals periodically
attempted to revivify the connection, but they more
frequently associated calling with specifically religious
work such as evangelization, or with personal moral
behavior, frequently revolving around the non-use of
alcohol. Christian vocation as work in the world was
not a central issue.
To what extent can we in the twentieth century celebrate work as an avenue for Christian vocation? The
slow slide of Christian vocation into work that occurred up through the seventeenth century both inflated
and degraded our view of work. On one hand success
in the economic world became a sign of God's election,
and therefore of ultimate significance. Work not
marked by economic rewards-the dull, mechanical
daily struggle in which so many live-was also affirmed as God's will, as punishment for sin and a test
fbid., p. 177.
" Tawney, p. 228.

of obedience. In neither case did this carnal version of
vocation allow faith a way to hold the world of work
accountable to a higher standard for human life. Thus
work stood autonomous and was blessed, but not
judged.
The meaning of work was also deflated, however.
The work itself was not important, only the obedience
or punishment it represented. The Protestant tradition
in particular belittled the human capacity to contribute
through work to the achievement of God's purposes
for human life. 32 In this way, the modern carnal concept of vocation as work helped reconcile people to
meaningless, pernicious, or degrading work, and render them passive to economic injustice.
The carnalized vocation of work has also served to
exacerbate our divisions from one another. Poor from
rich, unsuccessful from powerful, manual laborers
from professionals, the technically trained from the
liberally educated-these divisions are realities, but
carnalized views of vocation buttressed them by the
rhetoric of theology, liberal education, and idealist
philosophy, and reinforced aggressive individualism by
continually narrowing community.
There is no fruitful answer to our confusion about
work in dualistic theology. It will not help to lecture
our students or parishioners on the evils of selfseeking and the duties of love to the brother, and solicit them to abandon the flesh and seek the spirit. Nor
can we simply say "do your work carefully and well,
because God is in it, somewhere." What is needed is a
genuinely incarnational view of work, which does not
deny the self, but sets its relationship to the other;
which does not deny the secular, but sees in it both
Grace and Judgment; which does not renounce the
private, but fulfills it in the public and communal.
The thread of work as vocation meets especially the
church college audience from many different directions. One way is in the academic vocation claimed by
faculty, and that will be the subject of the second part of
this article. For now, what of the work our students will
encounter? Colleges are part of a complex technicalindustrial economy. They have traditionally provided skills which foster mobility and often lead to
careers of considerable social status and/or economic power.
The economy which provides the framework for our
work life now is at the stage of service capitalism, but
its growth sectors are dominated by very sophisticated
"high tech" industries. We have industries which once
employed less skilled labor, but they are in serious decline. Educational, human, and geographic barriers
prevent alleviation of those social and economic dislo-
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Soelle, pp. 66, 72-73.
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cations. Our economy is based on consumption rather
than geared to production of durable goods, and our
consumptive habits are inflated still more by mass
media and advertising. On the international scene, it
is necessary for us to have a whole cadre of underdeveloped countries in a state of permanent dependency
to provide us with raw materials, investment opportunities, and markets.
Liberal arts colleges, church colleges among them,
offer a fine education to groups who can benefit in
this state of society. Frequently they become professionals or managers, or go on to school for necessary
training to become leaders in high tech jobs. Many,
though certainly qot all, come to our colleges as
economically and educationally privileged young
people. Urban and suburban geography and the demographics of the geographic regions where some
church colleges are located offer many of our students
no substantial exposure to urban or racial problems in
their life before college. They share ideals of personal
liberation and self realization, and are optimistic about
their own futures, but they are pessimistic about the
institutional future of our society and the world . Some
care deeply about this but fee l powerless, anonymous,
uninvolved . Others are indifferent to social concerns
or find politics dirty." They are almost all obsessed
with what job they will get, what work they will do.
Many of our students are or will be "yuppies." The
following assessment of yuppie culture comes from
James M. Wall :
What seems to be missing at the heart of much of this
popular culture is what we might call a "religious sensibility." That term is not meant to suggest simply piety
or churchgoing, though both could be included in such
a description. Religious sensibility suggests a willingness
to take seriously one's place in the world as a member
of a loving community linked tightly with all other living creatures and living things . It also presumes that reality has a transcendent dimension ."
This is a dark assessment. It sets aside for the moment
all those who enter into careers of service to others,
and they are many. We have not personally created
this world, but in it many of us must live out our work
lives. What can church colleges offer to help us ally
our work to our vocation as Christians?
One perspective is the theological one. The world of
work can be affirmed as a positive avenue for service
to God, for participation in his continuing creation of
the world , but it must also be held accountable to a
" See Herman Diers, "Education for Participatory Citizenship" (Wartburg College, Waverly, Iowa, 1984).
' <james Wall, "Tracing the Yuppies from Adam 'til Now,"
The Christian Century (October 2, 1985).
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higher purpose than maximum production or profit
or personal success. We must disarm the deadly earnest success orientation and worship of work shared
by our students-and perhaps by us as well-and replace them with a bigger view of life's purpose. This
higher purpose for work has a public dimension.
Dorothy Soelle has called it affirmation of life rather
than death by fighting against the disposition of the
West to extermination shown in the rape of the earth,
the war against the poor, and the threat of nuclear annihilation.'5 T he affirmation of life in work will take
the shape of what Joseph Sittler has called "the care
of the earth." It will also be willing to meet the needs
created by economic structures with "structured love"
m the form of social justice.'6

The affirmation of life in work will
take the shape of what Joseph Sittler
has called "the care of the earth."
It will also be willing to meet the
needs created by economic structures
with "structured love"-social justice.
The affirmation of life rather than death has a more
personal side too. It leads us to accept anew the biblical view that the person who works is more important
than the product, and that God's call to personhood is
lived out in many contexts, not just in work. The
acknowledgment of a fuller sense of personhood can
in turn help us toward an allegiance to community in
the broadest sense, of connectedness to the whole
human race.
We can also offer students a richer understanding
of what work will mean in their lives by marshalling
all the various disciplinary perspectives availablepsychological ideas of human fulfillment in work and
in rest, sociological ideas about work in organization,
economic ideas about labor organization, and historical
treatments from the west and non-west abou~ differing
patterns and valuations for work. In our concern for
our students' future we have su pported them too
much in their worship of work. We now need to provide antidotes both theological and disciplinary for the
resulting imbalance.
" Soelle, pp. 2-3.
'"Joseph Sittler has advocated this position from different
points of view through all his many works. See particularly The Care of the Earth (Philadelphia, 1961) and his
contribution to Life in Community: Christian Social R esponsibility (1957) , entitled "The Structure of Christian
Ethics."
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Finally, we can challenge students to a richer understanding of their own personhood if we challenge
their total self-investment in paid work. Christian vocation is singular-one is called by God to join in completing his creation and enjoying his grace in all life.
But the arenas for encountering and living that calling
are multiple, and all of equal value. There is no natural, patriarchal division of labor that says certain
spheres belong to woman and others to man. It is not
greed and selfishness to want to share in many settings
for vocation (working, parenting, childing, spousing,
volunteering) as long as they are viewed as settings for
encountering grace and judgment and not as ends in
themselves. The demand for total allegiance to the
workplace and the elevation of economic productivity
above all other dimensions of human life is idolatry,
and we must say so. It does not matter if that work
setting is General Motors, or the local congregation, or
the church college.
The history of Christian vocation and work challenges us to reflect our incarnational view of vocation
in the policies of our institutions. This holds true for
our policies as employers and investors as well as
educators. Is our policy toward workers good
stewardship of the college resources or is it stingy and
exploitative?
Is our investment policy
good
stewardship or global exploitation? Do we affirm the
multiple settings for the vocation of our employees, or
do we demand their time and energy all for ourselves?
Do we innovate in developing employment policies
that bespeak peace, dignity, and reconciliation, or are
we too conservative (of our possessions) for that? 37
These are radical demands . Our current confusion
of Christian vocation with any kind of work has not
helped us to set the limits properly between what we
should celebrate and what we should renounce. Yet if
we seriously confront the demands of an incarnational
understanding of vocation for our lives as academics
and for our institutions, it is a terrifying prospect. We
long for the protective paradoxes of the Two Kingdoms to let us keep doing what we, and everyone else,
have been doing all along.
Indeed, there are risks in the radical demands of an
incarnational view of vocation, and to face them it requires an equally radical faith-a faith that God is at
work in the world we face, not only to sustain it but
to bless it, and to make it more just and more loving.
''Some interesting ways to include grace in the workplace
are mentioned in "Clairton, USA." They include removal
of merit ratings and other "objective" evaluations of service, "deep delegation" of authority, needs as a determinant of income and hours (e.g. flex-time). Also rich in
this regard is John Simmons and William Mares, Working

As H. Richard Niebuhr said of the reality Luther tried
so hard to capture in his theological concepts:
These are abstractions; the reality is the continuing
dialogue and struggle of the person with God, with its
questions and answers, its divine victories that look like
defeats, its human defeats that turn into victories.'"
Truly secularized or incarnational vocation means living this dialogue, and it is a very good thing.
Cl
38

Christ and Culture, p. 158.

A Babe in a Manger
Angels quickly diagnosed the child's
humanity and wept: "A birth defect
in the genotype, passed down
in the Adamic gene through Mary,
skipping the Father's divinitysuch a creature begins to die
the day it is born!"
Understanding perfectly the empathy
of millions of sinless minions,
yet absolutely unworried about
any recessive genes he'd passed on,
the Father buoyed all spirits:
"He's a normally human phenotype,
of a species with no wings
but with navel, tear ducts,
hands and feet, sides and back,
ears, eyes and tongueall vulnerable but wondrously working
natural human parts."
Passing out the lyrics
and the scores for the various voices
of the angelic community chorus
with harp accompaniment,
he cued them in: "Sing!
For heaven's sake, sing,
voicing my rejoicing,
and send out announcements:
the baby and mother are doing well,
and the Father is proud of his Son!"

Bernhard Hillila

Together (I 983).
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Peter Augustine Lawler

BELIEF, NON-BELIEF, AND THE COURT
Is the Constitution Neutral on the Existence of God?

According to the Supreme Court, the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment requires that government not only remain absolutely neutral in the disputes of opinion among the various forms of religious
belief, but also in the dispute between belief and nonbelief. The Constitution in no way requires or allows
government to be a partisan of God 's or the Creator's
existence. Nothing must be said or done that would
deny equal respect to the opinions of non-believers.
This principle of neutrality, since it was promulgated by the Court in Everson v. Board of Education in
194 7, has remained controversial. It, in truth, has become more controversial as the Court has deduced
more and more of its implications in, as Justice Stevens put it in Wallace v. Jaffree (1985), "the crucible of
litigation." Although the Court has, along the way,
made a few prudential concessions to time-tested practices such as prayer by legislative chaplains, its general
propensity has been to promote the total secularization
of public life.
This principle of neutrality, with its practical effect
of more or less total secularization, can reasonably be
challenged on at least two levels. First, it can be wondered whether American "public morality" or "public
philosophy" can be articulated persuasively without
any reference to God's existence. If "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" are not the foundation of
our political morality, then what is? Does not
America's cherished idea of equality, in particular, depend upon the common perception that all human beings are "created equal" and hence have, as Martin
Luther King, Jr. said, "God-given rights"? When
Richard John Neuhaus not long ago wrote powerfully
of The Naked Public Square, his fear was that the

Peter Augustine Lawler teaches in the Department of Social Science at Berry College in Georgia. His most recent
contribution to The Cresset, "Public Promotion of Silent
Prayer," appeared in January, 1986.
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commonly-perceived political purposes of Americans
would dissolve if stripped of all religious or divine
support.
A second set of questions about the principle of
neutrality concerns its practicality. Can government really extend equal respect to both belief and non-belief?
Can all opinions about religious matters be given the
same dignity? Perhaps this unlimited or promiscuous
openness will inevitably tend to favor non-belief or
skepticism about the truth of any particular assertion
about divine reality. Such a denial of the reality of the
supra-human could not possibly be conceived by a decent people as a destruction of morality or human distinctiveness. Hence it will have the propensity to establish "secular humanism" as America's most credible
and respected view about the foundation of morality
and politics.
These two challenges to the principle of neutrality
were thrust forcefully into public discussion early in
1987 by Federal District Court Judge Brevard Hand
of Mobile, Alabama. He banned forty-five textbooks
from the public schools on the grounds that their use
constituted the establishment of the religion of secular
humanism. Although in some respects even sympathetic observers must consider this decision an imprudent assertion of morally conservative judicial activism,
its guiding thought may be theoretically sound and
hence serve to instruct Americans about the meaning
of their fundamental principles. Judge Hand's primary
intention, of course, must have been theoretical. He
could not have expected his sweeping, unprecedented
decision to prevail on appeal (as, indeed, it has not).
He could not really have meant to do more than to
call public attention to a neglected and widely misunderstood constitutional problem.
Much of the evidence presented in Judge Hand's
court concerned what the public schools and their
textbooks seem to have understood the neutrality principle to require of them. To avoid controversial or potentially litigation-producing conclusions, they seem to
have decided to say nothing or as little as possible
The Cresset

about religion, and especially to avoid saying anything
that could conceivably be construed as favorable about
religious belief. According to New York University
psychologist Paul Vitz, primary school textbooks simply no longer acknowledge that Americans have or
have had a religious life. To remain neutral means to
ignore or, better, to lie about a fundamental part of
human reality.
Johns Hopkins historian Timothy L. Smith was able
to find some references to religion in history texts , but
they were invariably made to present religion or
religiously-based motivations as obstacles to America's
progress toward equality and liberty. The political relevance of the religious beliefs of slaveholders and
those opposing women's rights is discussed, but there is
no comparable account of the religiously-based enthusiasm of the Civil Rights Movement or the nineteenthcentury women's rights advocates. The guiding thought
seems to be that the movement toward social justice is
one away from religious belief. Surely this perception of
a connection between the achievement of moral and
political liberty and freedom from religion is at the
heart of what is called secular humanism.

The libertarian bias against the
possibility that human liberty could
be compatible with or even depend
upon belief in God is really a bias
against moral absolutism of any sort.
This libertarian bias against the possibility that
human liberty could be compatible with or even depend upon belief in God is really a bias against moral
absolutism of every sort, even that of the Declaration
of Independence. Morality is seen as merely a matter
of personal choice, and all choices, as long as they
are made freely or sincerely, are equally worthy of
respect.
Morality, as a result, does not depend upon the individual's perception of some non-idiosyncratic or objective reality that exists independently of human will.
Moral reality is, ultimately, made quite arbitrarily by
human beings. The foundation of all moral community is also, ultimately, equally arbitrary or accidental.
The textbooks' statements concerning "values" that
emerge from these conclusions are, as Robert Coles
testified in court, typically egoistic and superficial, not
to say "perverse." They are quite unfriendly to the
thought that the human individual really has duties to
his Creator or his fellow creatures.
The principle of neutrality has led today's textbooks
December, 1987

to tend to regard liberty as dependent on a candid affirmation of a moral relativism that prevents one from
having any disrespect for the "value judgments" of
other human beings. But even this rule necessarily implies an exception: those judgments that falsely and
perniciously claim to be more than idiosyncratic selfassertions. Into this category, surely, falls almost all
theistic belief. It must be said that the Court's command to be neutral has produced a bias against moral
and religious doctrines that are based on the untruth
of moral relativism, that see moral principles as more
than merely subjective "values."
This bias, interpreted as part of a constitutional
mandate, must be theoretically unsound. It is incompatible with American political principles as articulated
in the Declaration and the Constitution. Despite its silence on God and religious belief, the American Constitution could hardly be construed to require or even
allow public neutrality on the question of the objective
foundation of public morality and even on the existence of God. The Constitution is also silent on the
Declaration's "inalienable rights," but any reader of
The Federalist and the Anti-Federalist writings knows
that it was universally assumed that the purpose of
government is to protect rights which exist prior to
any human creation or "by nature."
The Declaration's idea of the inalienability of natural rights depends upon "natural theology," the clear
articulation of the distinctions which separate beast,
man, and God. Consequently, it can be said truly that
the political institutions established by the Constituttion, as Justice Douglas said in Zorach v. Clauson
(1952), do "presuppose a Supreme Being."
The Declaration's thought that rights are inalienable
means that any clear conception of human nature includes rights. Human beings are, essentially, selfconscious and embodied. In their self-consciousness,
they are like God; like beasts, they are embodied.
They exist, as creatures, somewhere between beast and
God. Because of this "inbetweeness," they have rights.
Beasts may, in a way, need rights, in view of their
mortality and vulnerability, but they do not in truth
possess them because they are unaware of their neediness and hence cannot use or exercise them. God
does not have rights because, not being mortal, he
does not need them. Human beings have rights because each of them is aware, when he or she thinks
clearly or consistently about him- or herself, that he or
she is not God. This awareness separates human beings from other creatures. Because it was not created
by them, it must have been a gift to them from the
Creator.
It is possible to assert, at least for now, that this conception of God is not necessarily the God of the Bible.
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"Nature's God" may be, primarily or at least for J effe rson , the Declaration's primary author, the God of
the philosophers, a being postu lated on the basis of
the conviction that nature is partly accessible to human
reason and to remind philosophers that they know
that they are not and cannot become wise.

At the heart of secular humanism
lies the philosophic decision to
dispense with the idea of a Supreme
Being as an illusionary and undesirable
limitation on human freedom.
Socrates knew that, by nature, Socrates was not and
could not become God. He had what he knew would
be an always elusive conception of divine perfection
which ordered and directed his human life. But not all
philosophers, it must be added, speak of "Nature's
God " or some equivalent, and any thought which dispenses with the idea of a Supreme Being that will always remain beyond human being is incompatible with
the Declaration.
At the heart of secular humanism is the philosophic
decision to dispense with the idea of a Supreme Being
as an illu sory and undesirable limitation on human
freedom. T his decision, as Karl Marx and John Dewey
say in different ways, produces the conclusion that
"man is the highest being for man." As a result, there
are really no longer any perceptible limits to what
h uman beings might do. "Secular humanism" means
that human beings can define their humanity without
reference to God, though the absence of God wou ld
seem to preclude, as a dogmatic limitation of human
freedom, any such definition in the precise sense.
American constitutionalism and its doctrine of the
inalienability of rights are based on the perception of
a certain stability or permanence to human nature.
This constitutionalism implies that human beings are
"constituted" by nature. They are not indefinitely perfec tible and could not be transformed fundamentally
by h uman effort.
T his constitutionalism, consequently, opposes the
historicism of any form of the "theology of liberation"
which holds that "the Kingdom of God" can or will appear on earth through human effort. It affirms, ultimately, the pettiness of all human creation in the light
of the Creator, which is not the same thing, of course,
as denying that such creation has considerable human
value. Human beings are free to improve their human
condition, but they cannot fundamentally transform
that condition into something else.
T he American public morality embodied in the Dec-
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laration and the Constitution, which should be at the
foundation of the "civic" component of public education, is not neutral or indifferent concerning the existence of God. The origin of the doctrine of neutrality,
I suspect, is found in the thought that the truth of the
doctrine of inalienable rights can be a matter of indifference for American citizens. Yet even the most "enlightened" or "libertarian" of the founders, such as
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who are held
by the Supreme Court to be the source of the doctrine
of neutrality, did not believe that Americans could defend their liberty in theory or in deed if they ceased
to believe that human beings, in truth, have rights that
are the gift of nature and nature's God.
This limit to American public moral relativism implies nothing, necessarily, about another issue of special concern to Judge Hand, prayer in the public
schools. If school prayer were the only exception in a
curriculum which otherwise denied the political or
educational revelance of the existence of God, then
public education would still be fundamentally antagonistic to the truth of American constitutional morality and its doctrine of inalienable rights. How could
a teacher explain to children why all human beings are
"created equal" without employing some conception of
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the Creator?
In Engle v. Vitale (1962), the Supreme Court decision outlawing school prayer, Justice Black allowed
"that school children and others" may still be "officially encouraged to express love of our country by reciting such historical documents as the Declaration of
Independence which contain reference to the Deity."
But surely, at least in the best cases, even today Americans truly "express love" of America by discovering
for themselves and affirming the truth of the Declaration's principles, not by thoughtlessly revering its sentiments as part of the country's past. The Declaration
itself is radically anti-traditional; it is opposed to the
uncritical affirmation of what one has been given by
authority; the truth is "self-evident."
If the Declaration is truly worthy of our respect,
then school children should be led by their teachers to
understand and discuss its principles, and not to be indifferent to their truth or falsity. In such a discussion,
must or even can a teacher remain indifferent concerning whether the Declaration's "reference to the
Deity" reflects the truth and is required to establish
the inalienability of rights? A serious discussion of the
question of the perennial relevance of the Declaration's principles for human beings could not, finally,
be required to give equal respect to atheistic opinion.
The Constitution, in truth, cannot be interpreted to
command such neutrality. It does not, of course, allow
for the suppression of public expressions of atheistic
opinion, as even John Locke recommended, but it
does require that the duties of American citizens and
the purposes of American political order be articulated
in the light of the relation between human and divine
reality.
One model for the articulation of this relationship is
James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly misinterpreted as a primary source for its
principle of neutrality. Madison defines religious liberty as an inalienable right, and as a freedom from
political compulsion given by nature to the human individual for the discovery of his or her duty to his or
her Creator. Freedom of religion is freedom for religion, for the uncoerced use of one's natural faculties
for the discovery of the duties of a creature. Its
acknowledgment is an affirmation of the genuinely religious dimension of human nature, and it does not, in
truth, give equal respect to atheistic opinion, because
such opinion could not generate an adequate account
of the human goodness of religious liberty. If freedom
from political compulsion is not for the discovery of
duties not of one's own making, but for arbitrary willfullness or unlimited "choice," it is not at all clear why
such freedom is good for or worthy of human beings.
December, 1987

In view of its partisanship, Madison's doctrine, if
taught today in public schools as true or even worthy
of special consideration, might well be declared unconstitutional. If Judge Hand has done nothing more
than to cause Americans to reflect seriously on this remarkable implication of the Supreme Court's erroneous principle of constitutional interpretation, we are
all greatly indebted to him. The principle of absolute
neutrality is really theoretically unsound and practiCl
cally unworkable.

Poems with No Names:
The Sacred Pathway I
(After Lao Tzu)
1.
Some say there are seven types,
All ambiguous,
Each dubious, some even forgotten.
Everyone was in the beginning
A signpost to the right pathway.

2.
The wisest among us were once even wiser
But no one would listen.
They were like
One treading water
One walking on ice
One accepting the cup
One picking a flower
One fighting the rapids
One walking the right path
Always tired, always alert.
3.
Return to where you began
And find there your self.
Pass along the way others leaving
Going from where you return.
Do not pity them,
Walk on where you must go,
Your way is clear; your desire, divine.

Travis DuPriest
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Cultural
Illiteracy?
linda Ferguson
Each teaching enterprise has to
start somewhere, and lately I'm losing ground. I know I am not alone.
E. D. Hirsch's Cultural Literacy has
focused public attention on an obstacle which professors have recognized for some time: the absence of
cultural consensus about what constitutes "common knowledge. "
A colleague laments that music
majors stare blankly when he cites
the harmonic progression of Old
Hundredth. "You know , 'Praise
God from Whom all blessings
flow,'" he prompts. They stare. He
plays and sings it. Some register
recognition, but its usefulness to
the teacher's point has vanished.
Predicting
reliable
reference
points is risky, so I assigned a selection from the Republic the other
day even though it was not in the
syllabus. The syllabus had us reading Abbott's Flatland, a nineteenthcentury fantasy of a "flatlander's"
journey into the third dimension.
The students had eagerly discussed
the beginning of the narrative: they
found humor in two-dimensional
society;
they
understood
the
mathematical terms of Abbott's
created universe and they were engaged by his imparting of personalities, life histories , and social
institutions to geometric figures.
But once the terms of life in a
world of two dimensions were un18

derstood and a few amusmg anecdotes digested , the students were
stumped. They did not see the traditional motifs: learning as painful;
the unrelenting guide for the reluctant learner; the danger of defining reality on the basis of limited
experience; the blinding light
which temporarily paralyzes the
learner; the desire of the liberated
learner to teach others the truth;
the despair of knowing but not
being able to communicate what
one knows. These themes resonated with little in their education
or experience. Without the cave allegory and the Divided Line we
could not unpack our scheduled
text.
Further, the sections of Flatland
are framed with quotations, undocumented. No students recognize
the phrases, except for one young
woman who points to "0 Brave
New World . . . " "We read that
book in high school,'' she says and
proposes a vaguely appropriate
parallel between that text and this
one, concluding that Abbott must
be alluding to Huxley.
But, I object, Huxley's Brave New
World was written long after Abbott's Flatland. Then Huxley was
borrowing from Abbott! But why
does Abbott's phrase look like a
quotation? Because he was quoting
from someone else and (the light
bulb goes on here) so was Huxley.
Now we are getting somewhere.
The triumph is not that we now
can connect Abbott with Huxley or
Huxley with Abbott, or that we
now connect either of them with
Shakespeare. Rather, it lies in recognition that two authors, writing
in different times , knew a common
source. And perhaps they assume
their readers will know it too!
In teaching classical music to
"general" students, one of my few
safe assumptions is that they will
respond to the Overture to Barber
of Seville. They think it is funny

music, and it is. Its humor emerges
from the exaggerated contrasts and
gestures of the overture's tonal
structures, and also from its associations with the silly story it introduces. But my students' recognition
of its humor is neither abstractly
musical nor referential to Rossini's
comedy. Rather, they know it is
funny because it is "from" a
Bugs Bunny cartoon ("The Rabbit
of Seville"), which apparently everyone has seen but me.
By contrast, I have known the
luxury of reading the Aeneid with
undergraduates who discussed it as
if they had also read the Odyssey
and the Iliad, which they had. On a
lower plane, I was once delighted
to discover that everyone in the
classroom knew some songs by
Stephen Foster. This in itself was
no accomplishment, but it allowed
me
to
delineate
types
of
nineteenth-century popular music
and get on with the main lecture.
The success of these lessons rested
not on teaching skill but on "good
starting field position."
A relatively new responsibility of
teaching is to cajole students into
releasing what they take to be
necessary connections (Ravel's Bolero with the movie 10, Pachelbel's
Canon with wine commercials) so
they can embrace more fundamental ones. I don't mind at all that
classical music themes are "borrowed" for popular culture applications. But when Rossini's overture
is recognized as funny only because
it is associated with cartoons, when
these shadowy associations become
the basis of "common knowledge,"
then we push deeper and deeper
into the cave, and we name increasingly insubstantial parts. Students
are settling for images when they
should
demand
objects,
for
shadows of images instead of images themselves.
Next week we'll read The Tempest .

••
••
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C.F.W. Walther
Redivided
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor:
On the floor there seems to be a
small stack of magazines which
move from one end of the couch to
the other, with each vaccuming.
These magazines are open to articles either half-read or wanting
further attention, one consisting of
25 "theses" written by a man
named Walther. A magazine last
spring devoted 15 pages to these
theses and some commentary, reprinting them from a 1962 issue of
the same magazine. The theses
have to do with "properly dividing"
the Law and Gospel; they seem to
fall into the category of theology.
Noticing these the other day, I
remembered third grade at Trinity
School. We had workbooks celebrating the 1OOth anniversary of
the Missouri Synod. C. F. W.
Walther had a full beard and three
initials before you got to his last
name-an exotic figure in a
smooth-shaven Indiana town with
streets blandly named for compass
directions and American generals.
From third grade at the corner

Charles Vandersee, with other editors
of The Letters of Henry Adams, expects to read a paper on Adams at the
Modem Language Association meeting
in San Francisco this month.
December, 1987

of North and Grant streets I also
remembered Law and Gospel.
"The Law shows us our sin; the
Gospel shows us our Savior." The
Law was a mirror, and the Gospel
was the good news. But these were
slogans for the young, a different
matter from theology. Here in
these theses was C. F. W. Walther
engaged in actually "doing"-as
one sometimes hears it-theology.
He was also, in St. Louis in 1880,
doing other things, I noticed. I recognized my own third-grade impulse in the project: making lists.
Something I have not outgrown,
absorbed lately in a final list of the
thousands of letters of Henry
Adams, a younger contemporary of
Walther, given to doing history
rather than theology. Walther had
found 21 ways of not properly dividing Law and Gospel, and I
could tell from the vigor of his
prose that he enjoyed making the
list.
Walther was also, it appeared,
helping the Synod's clergy write
sermons. Third-graders in 194 7
were taught to be grateful to God
for his mercy, which had now authorized sermons of 20 minutes. In
Dr. Walther's day, we often heard,
you sat for a full hour. Filling an
hour required big theology, and
that may have been a reason for
the length of the list. The theses
seem addressed to "the preacher,"
and 21 ways of not properly dividing would help with sermons for
the long Trinity season.
So "doing theology" meant satisfying an inner need for making
lists, and supplying rural parsons
with pulpit material. Indeed, essential pulpit material, since without
the 21 ways "Scripture is and remains a sealed book" (Thesis IV).
Right now making a list of my
own ("doing speculation," you
might say), I can mention other
aims of Walther. By choosing to
make a list of negatives, he evidently wants to expose the abun-

dance of errors available to the Lutheran preacher. He says mostly
"when" rather than "if': "The
Word of God is not properly divided [between Law and Gospel]
when the Gospel is turned into a
preaching of repentance."
A further motive appears to be
the affirming of a specific tradition,
one that Luther found so valuable:
the Law as that voice of God which
is "stern" (VI), which strikes down
and terrifies (IX), which makes demands and threats (XXIII). In or
about third grade, having memorized Psalm 23 a year or two earlier, we were made to memorize
Psalm I. Probably this was Synod's
lesson plan going back to 184 7.
The psalm depicted a man whose
"delight" was in the law of the
Lord, such that he meditated upon
it day and night. In later years,
after Trinity School, it was surprising to discover that the Law, or
Torah, meant "teaching" and "guidance" as much as it did "mirror"
and "terror"; as m Walther's
XXIII, it meant "promises," and in
the Jewish tradition it meant joy
and nourishment, the good news of
a God who sent discipline.
But I noticed chiefly in Walther
an eagerness to master complexity.
Not only complexity but apparent
contradictions. "The problem, says
Walther, is this: The Bible, more
than any other book, seems full of
contradictions. It seems to contradict itself not merely at the
edges but at its center." Thus the
twentieth-century commentators on
Walther's theses.
To a thinking being, the perception of problems may be the chief
source of life. Without complexity
to control and riddles to break, we
sense that a kind of death is taking
over-a sort of malignant quiescence, rest that is not rest. Walther
may wish to safeguard us from this
kind of rest. The commentators tell
us (IV) that "the great purpose of
all of Scripture is to bring men to
19

the knowledge and appreciation of
God's love for them." That is a
startlingly simple statement. You
might think that a reader who has
gone through large chunks of the
non-chronicle parts of the Hebrew
Scriptures and any 20 chapters of
the Apostolic Writings would gain
some clear sense of God's love.
Even granting the extraordinary
tribulations of Israel, God does
seem benign now and then.
But President Walther, if I understand him, is impatient with appearances--doubtful of such an unmediated foray into Scripture. As
noted, Scripture "remains a sealed
book" unless you have prior knowledge of the distinction between
Law and Gospel (IV). This is a
high order of complexity; not only
must a distinction be understood
before Scripture is opened, but the
complexity of the distinction requires the Waltherian 21 theses as
a prior study. That is, the distinction itself is so complex that there
exist 21 ways of getting it wrong.
On the other hand, possibly
Walther is also fascinated by the
complexity of metaphor; does he
ri-Iean a "sealed book" in the sense
that you might as well not open the
Bible until you properly divide Law
and Gospel, or does he mean that
without Law and Gospel properly
divided, you can read the Bible all
night and all day but will not understand it? That is, narrative without theory is death?
Either way, the path to salvation
is formidable, though perhaps not
as much as it seems. The Missouri
Synod in 1880 was still in a sense
an immigrant church, and immigrants came with more energy than
most people-more get-up-and-go,
as grandparently types used to say,
in pauses between chapters of
Scripture. And the rural Midwest
winter evenings were long and
dark, suitable for strenuous effort
at properly dividing. To get up to
the Bible, and then through it to
20

get saved, you just work hard, until
you get things right. If I were a
trained Lutheran theologian, I
would know whether 21 have since
become 22 or more.

Does night come before
day? Does day come
before night? There's
fascination in doing
speculation 100 years
after a man has been
doing theology.
Does night come before day?
Does day come before night?
There's fascination in doing speculation 100 years after a man has
been doing theology. Thesis VII
deals with way #3 of not properly
dividing: When Gospel is preached
before (that is, prior to) Law, when
sanctification is preached before
justification, when faith is preached
before repentance, when good
works are preached before grace.
Raised in Reading, Pennsylvania,
the poet Wallace Stevens in "The
Old Lutheran Bells at Home" says
those bells are "the voices of the
pastors calling I Much rough-end
being to smooth Paradise." In
another poem he speaks of the
"blessed rage for order" which
human beings possess. Calling it
"blessed" does not make it so, of
course; the impulse, if natural to
fallen humanity , could also conceivably-or even necessarily-be called
diabolic. Whichever it is, we seem
to see it in Walther; propelled into
language, possibly by this rage, he
proceeds with exceptional firmness
and precision, properly dividing,
like a highway worker laying a
white line. We watch fascinated; he
is not looking into the berry bushes
on the side.
Still, others may idly do so.
There is rough-end being, an iffy-

ness.
"If." Could you not preach faith
before repentance once in a while?
(For that inexplicable heathen in
the German pew idly wondering
what the life of faith would be like
if he decided to repent?) Could you
now and then talk about sanctification before justification, if for some
people holiness is a little easier to
understand than vicarious atonement? (As certain eerie old ballads
are easier to understand than Wallace Stevens, but in the light of
their strangeness, Stevens seems less
weird.) And good works--somehow
this sounds like possibly an effective
pedagogical route into grace, if
grace can be thought of as God's
own "good work" toward man. For
maximum effect, should first things
always come first? If it may be that
logic does not always match the
pluralism of human understanding.
An architect at the University in
Dogwood, in a paper for a conference this fall , divides as follows:
A basic theory course should be at

the beginning of architectural
studies. Too often, we begin not
with theory, but with a set of challenging design problems intended
to raise issues of "creativity" and
"imagination," stretching the students to the edge of their abilities.
Unfortunately, the results often
demonstrate that we sometimes
push the students beyond their
abilities, over the edge and into the
abyss of tasteless undigested confusiOn.
This architect and I enjoy contradicting one another, to cope
with the enervating fact that on
most matters we agree. In accepting his invitation to critique the
paper, I therefore asked :
Could one not argue with some
success that architectural education
should begin with the ambitious design problems you deplore? That
is, the resulting chaos and indigestion might well be the essential
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chastening experience that prepares a student to receive ideas.
In other words, there is the logic
of intent, and there is the logic of
effect. According to Dr. Walther,
God's pedagogical logic is the logic
of intent; if you intend for a person to attain the proper idea of
Gospel, sanctification, faith , and
good works, you must precede
them, respectively, with Law, justification, repentance, and grace. I
don't know how well this works
out, but perhaps outcome is not the
divine criterion.
It is true that logic comes up
against human reality in Thesis
VIII, where human reality seems
triumphant. "The Word of God is
not properly divided when the Law
is preached to those who are already in terror on account of their
sins, or the Gospel to those who
live securely in their sins." Neither
of these categories describes anyone I knew in Trinity congregation, but no matter. As to what to
do to avoid this improper division,
the modern commentators say that
the pastor, like his Lord, "must
know" when to speak forgiveness to
harlots and when to denounce a
Pharisee. They grant that in the
pulpit it's hard to speak to opposites at once, as on a highway it's
hard to pedal down both sides of
the white line.
There are dividing lines, and
there are circles; should we inquire
what Dr. Walther thinks of the
"hermeneutical circle"? Whereby
you can't understand something
unless you already know it, and
can't really learn something unless
you've already picked up acquaintance with it. A sort of "catch-22."
You're not prepared for the taste
of each summer's fresh raspberries
unless you enjoyed them last summer. The commentators say that
"the preaching of the Law prepares
the hearer for the Gospel by showing him his need," but still, it was
December, 1987

last summer's raspberries that
showed me my need for the ones
this summer. Not starvation or deprivation, but prior experience of
the good. Perhaps a contrivance of
God, the way that some things can
simultaneously precede and follow
some others. Of the line and the
circle, which more resembles God?
Still, "doing speculation" is not
doing justice to theology, the queen
of the sciences. Doing up, as it
were , her hair in the golden splendor that God himself, engrossed in
mere narrative, seldom perhaps
managed. It is foolhardy for an untrained layman to play at catching,
in his 21 ways of not dividing, a
theologian divided against himself
and conceivably in diabolical relation to his God.
Even so, one occasionally sees
one's own ignorance touching, like
a tangent line in geometry, some
circle of profound thought. The

Lutheran theologian Richard John
Neuhaus has recently discussed
"pluralism," pluralism meaning
various things, such as the fact that
different human beings experience
reality in different ways. Or, that
different cultures "order human
life" in different ways. "The world
is pluralistic-in the sense of contradictory definitions of reality at
war with one another-because the
world is not yet complete." End
time is not yet here.
Meanwhile, says Neuhaus, in
what I find a helpful gloss on the
theses and their commentary: "I
think we must be prepared to say
that not only is pluralism written
into the script of history but that
God has done the writing," the
God who seems to me more of a
circle than a dividing line, despite
Trinity's efforts.
From Dogwood, faithfully yours,

c.v.

..

Air Traffic
Awed Mary met one in the light of day,
and the heavens were packed with them one night
as they came caroling for shepherds.
What would I have hoped and feared,
if I had been a pastor in that Christmas pasture?
When layers on layers of angels
lasered the sky with glory all around,
my earthling eyes, more used to bird-watching,
would have swung to sparrows with their tiny wings,
blinking at that midnight break of daylight.
Then, under incandescent, singing skies,
I'd have prayed for Icarus-swallows,
winging heaven-bent toward the light,
that they would safely land on stable earth.

Bernhard Hillila
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The Deconstruction
Of School
James Combs
Who invented School? At some
early point in the establishment of
civilization, someone, to his or her
utter infamy, got the pernicious
idea to start School. And ever
since, we have been deluded by one
of the ultimate master-myths,
shared by practically every society
and ideology: Education is The Answer.
That archetypical fallacy ranks
up there in mischief with Love
Conquers All, God Is on Our Side,
and War Solves Problems for
Good . After war and religious
fanaticism, School has probably
caused humankind the most misery. And since as a species we are
all the more ardently committed to
the Principle of Self-Inflicted Pain
(sometimes called the Joy of the
Hammer: we keep beating ourselves over the head with hammers
of our own creation because it will
feel so good when we stop), School
has served us well as an instrument
of torture.
This must be its principal function, unless it is to justify our other
painful pursuits of violence and

James Combs, a regular contributor
to The Cresset, leaches in the Department of Political Science at Valparaiso
University.
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prejudice. But at least savagery and
bigotry are honest emotions. School
proceeds on the uncanny delusion
that Humankind IS Educable,
Reason can Prevail, and Civilization
can avert war through Education.
School is worse than a fraud; it is
a mistake. If the human race is
ever to achieve some kind of secular or sacred salvation, it will have
to come from somewhere other
than School.
Consider our century. In 1914,
an educated civilization, led by the
highly educated graduates of Oxford and Paris and Heidelberg,
blundered into a trap the tribes of
New Guinea would avoid. In 1933,
Germany was probably the besteducated country in Europe. As
our century deteriorates into endless and total war and a variety of
conflicting fanaticisms, our commitment to School is all the more ardent. It is as if School is the handmaiden of disaster, expanding exponentially with chaos. In America,
the "best and the brightest," the
products of elite schools and
graduate programs and chart-andpointer seminars and books and innovative ideas, managed the stock
market crash ( 1929 or 1987, take
your pick), thought up the Vietnam
War, conceived the Democratic
party primary system, and dreamed
up the "rules of engagement" in
the Persian Gulf. If world war and
depression are now in the offing,
they will be products of the concerted effort of the Well Schooled.
Is it then the case that the more
schooling we have, the more ignorantly we act? Or is it rather that
School is not so much pernicious as
naive, telling us to be Good, Generous, and Peaceable, when there is
no way we can be any of those
things outside the hallowed halls of
ivy?
In any event, everybody nowadays is talking about School-what's
wrong with it, where it went awry,
what needs to be done, why we

need more and better of it. We are
told that little kids will have to go
to School the year around, with
longer hours, more homework,
tougher curricula, and more discipline. High schools will have to
teach more science, math, and
technology; teachers will have to
pass competency tests, constantly
retool, and be rewarded as individual Master Teachers.
Schools at all levels will have to
return to the original intent of educational fundamentalism: no frills,
no nonsense, no fun courses. Colleges are urged to put students to
contemplating the Great Books. We
worry about "cultural literacy," and
argue that students should know
about such things as the sword of
Damocles, neoclassicism, Romulus
and Remus, and Zeitgeist. As a nation, it is estimated that we spend
around 300 billion dollars on
School, more than anyone else, and
contend that that is not enough.
We are told that we need more
School at all levels, for all ages,
with the prospect that someday we
will turn society into one gigantic
School.
It is touching how much faith we
have put in the power of School to
produce the results we want. But
we share only the faith. After that,
everybody from Presidents and
Secretaries of Education to all varieties of ideological and interest
groups have an agenda-X should
be taught, Y should not be taught,
approach A is the correct pedagogy, approach B is the cause of all
the trouble right here in River City.
Although much lip service is
given to the myth of education,
most of those with an educational
agenda understand the true function of School: indoctrination.
Those who seek power over curricula and pedagogy are implicitly
saying to students, we know what's
best for you; we're now going to
tell you how you should think and
act; if we succeed, you'll become
The Cresset

the kind of person we want, and
part of the kind of society we want;
if not, there's something wrong
with you that has to be either
punished or scorned. Those who
seek power over School always
seem to have what psychologists
call a "Pygmalion project": you are
to be as I want you to be. It is no
wonder the millions of Eliza Doolittles in School come to hate and resent the many Professor Higgenses
who try to remodel them.
Students from kindergarten to
law school have long since figured
all this out, and have devised selfdefensive strategies to cope with
such a personal onslaught. They do
not believe in the official myth of
educability, but they certainly believe in sustaining their own sanity
and survival. The real learning that
goes on at School is students selfeducating themselves as to how to
use, beat, or avoid the system, skills
that do in fact help them in coping
with the other systems of power
they must face and endure in the
course of their lives.
This is evident in the several attitudes toward School students typically take. First, there is the attitude that School is Prison, and
students are the inmates. This notion is first acquired in kindergarten, with the child's first encounter
with the teacher-warden, who defines the job (like the teacher in
About Last Night) as the task of
breaking the students' spirit. As in
any incarcerated situation, the prisoners learn the system's blind spots,
and live and learn in spite of the
rules and the rulers. This then is
complemented by the idea that
School is Leisure, in the interstices
of the work day, in courting,
grouping, funning, and trashing.
Inner-city schools nowadays are
viewed by those outside the slums
as Reformatories, but for various
interest groups-street gangs, drug
dealers, prostitutes, policemenSchool is a convenient location for
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their enterprises.
In wealthier suburban schools
there is the concept of School as a
Commodity, something to be consumed as preparation for a lifetime
of Yuppiedom. This includes not
only mastery of those technical
skills that someday will put the students on the floor of the Stock Exchange, but also the informal skills
of social snobbery, making them
aware of the proper status hierarchy and the "up-scale" symbols that
signify the commodification of
their lives. At most residential colleges and universities, the attitude
that School is a Party is dominant,
especially where an active and powerful fraternity and sorority system
thrives. Since such schools are dependent on the good graces and
money of alumni who recall the
hell-raisin' Party Days of College,
instruction proceeds as a minor annoyance that only occasionally interferes with the primary function
of the institution.

Students have lost
interest in an education
that is irrelevant to
their lives and replaced
it with pop education,
what they learn from mass
culture and each other.

There is, finally, the conception
of School as Scholarship, an opportunity for encounter with, and
learning from, the Great Tradition,
Great Books, Great Ideas, and indeed even more recent not-so-great
glimmerings. I include this attitude
for logical completion and not on
the basis of personal experience.
Is it not obvious, then, that
School has become a meaningless
ritual, something that has become
perverted and meaningless? The
desperate attempts by educational

and political elites to justify and
shore up School should give us a
clue that School is in real trouble.
It is not in trouble because of the
wrong curriculum, or teachers'
unions, or lack of money. It is in
trouble because we have lost our
clientele's attention.
Students have lost interest in an
education that is irrelevant to their
lives, and superseded it with popular education, what they learn from
mass culture and each other. Kids
truly do hate School because it interferes with their Education. They
have not the slightest interest in
Cultural Literacy, but have a great
deal of interest in Cultural Mediacy. Their attention span in the 50minute lecture is less than zero; but
their attention span for MTV is
more than rapt. Since they are no
longer authority figures, teachers
get no respect; but the authority
figures of Entertainment Tonight and
Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous get
nothing but respect. (Students,
after all, certainly ask what one fellow called "the American Question": If you're so smart, why aren't
you rich?) School is a nineteenthcentury institution overwhelmed by
changes those that still believe in it
cannot comprehend, and undoubtedly by the mid-twenty-first century will be nostalgically remembered with the same curiosity as
other archaic practices of the previous
century-the
industrial
assembly-line plant, the printed
book, and the Supreme Court.
If all this is the case, then it
seems to me that there is only one
viable solution: abolish School. Like
the American steel and automobile
industry, School suffers from
gigantism and self-conscious doubt;
it produces less at greater cost; and
it cannot compete with innovative
ways of doing things. The ritual
format of School hasn't changed essentially in a hundred years , and to
return to a McGuffey's Reader approach would make it all the more
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an enshrined Greenfield Villagecum-Little Red Schoolhouse. Indeed , the very communication and
technological revolution that destroyed School gives us new ways of
organizing it for those who insist
upon it. School could now all be
done with television and attendant
technologies.
Consider the social benefits of
such a change. First, think of the
savings to taxpayers, tuition-payers,
and contributors who support
School in its pr.esent form . The
current inefficient, costly, and outmoded institutions would disappear
in favor of a free-enterprise approach: parents would have direct
control of their children's education, ending a great deal of useless
conflict over what is to be taught.
Conservatives would like the familial and local control such a move
would entail, and liberals would
applaud the inability of state or religious groups to impose their
values.
Learning would then be centered
in whatever a family chooses-direct home instruction, buying into
a cable educational program, sending kids to a neighborhood day
school, or better, not sending them
to school at all. Video rental stores
would include educational tapes
parents or students could select,
with a wide selection to cater to the
diverse interests and needs of those
who rent. All of this would
strengthen the family unit, free up
many billions for use on everything
from weaponry to the homeless,
and make society happier and
freer-children
spending more
time in play than drudgery, students concentrating in front of
home terminals on what they think
is worthwhile, small classes of likeminded people discussing a book, a
movie, or an improvised play they
just enacted.
Political conflict would lessen, social hi~rarchy would stabilize, and
cultural diversity flourish . School
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would no longer be the focus of irreconcilable clashes; children would
learn realistically what their lifechances are and either be resigned
to a fate of immobility and penury
or emboldened by the promise of
mobility and affluence; and if we
are to be a post-modern "nation of
tribes" (divided, for example, between those who believe in economic regulation and moral freedom on the one hand and those
who believe in economic freedom
and moral regulation on the other),
then at least students would learn
where their group stands.
This idea is not only technically
feasible , it is also democratically
sound, placing the responsibility
for education in the hands of parents and groups and indeed even

the student's own consideration of
what constitutes self-education.
And it is not necessarily narrowly
intolerant: the availability of a variety of educational channels and
tape programs might well teach
something of the plurality and
legitimacy of different perspectives.
Indeed, entertainment channels
might come to realize their education potential and include didactic
approaches-rock video channels
already
propagandize
against
drugs, and could provide musical
education; sports channels could
teach about the logic of conflict,
strategy, the lessons of sport, and
so on; and movie channels could
offer discussion of film aesthetics
and interpretation. Since much future television will be interactive,

As Decreed
(for T.D., D.D. , K.D., B.P., Westville)

Some will be tugged from numb wombs.
Weaned into waking on pull-apart love.
Grudged without answers from echoes, from
shadows, from mirrors, a role in the plan.
They are the rags. Sponging blue nighthowls
from windowless walls. Soaking up bent spoons'
staccato down cages stacked metal on metal.
Mopping for compost anger with dreams
left at the doors locked for learning. They're
wrung by hand into buckets of screaming graffiti.
Could we have beckoned them into our
scoured-white rooms, warned them that
mimicking madness means skylights sealed off
and cracks in black windows and access
to towers?
But some, as decreed , must absorb din of
anonymous monsters. Others may sleep.

Lois Reiner
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kids could talk to each other all
over the world, making for a global
village of wired young communicators in touch with humankind. Freed from the drudgery of
School, each child's room at home
could become at once classroom,
lab, and window on the world, finally realizing the true promise of
learning and the educational potential of television.
When television first came into
being, there was much earnest
hope that it would serve the purposes of education. The halting attempts at "educational TV"-TV
courses, PBS, Sesame Street, and so
on-were limited, but may have
been the opening rounds of an
educational revolution, helping to
create a post-School world. School
proceeded on the mistake that
learning should be induced in the
ritual setting of a coercive institution; post-School learning will go
forward on the intriguing premise
that learning can only occur if it is
sought, and that new technology in
a non-institutional environment
provides the safe and chosen
means for those who seek. For
those who are uneducable, School
was a waste of time anyway; such a
new arrangement can't harm them
any more than School did, and
might even help them, directing
them towards understanding their
true interests. The college student
who really wanted to be an automobile mechanic will discover
and seek that end. Those who are
educable will not be thwarted or
discouraged by School, but rather
flourish in a playful and curious
personal inquiry.
If
television
and
terminal
technology destroy School and enhance Education, they will have
served two great historical functions and have realized a truly revolutionary
potential
to
move
humankind beyond the pain of
School and towards the pleasure of
Learning.
Cl
December, 1987

Gamesmanship?
Gail McGrew Eifrig
One of the problems in listening
to the Public Radio news programs
is the undocumentable character of
its reporting. I certainly do not
mean to discredit the reporters, but
the medium is hard to quote from.
I have just spent an hour or so
looking through the New York
Times, the Wall Street journal, the
Washington Post, and the Christian
Science Monitor, but none of them
quotes what I heard George Shultz
say on the afternoon of September
11.
Those who read what I have to
say will simply have to trust that I
give as accurate a report as I can
remember of the words that have
been in my mind ever since. He
was responding to questions about
the message he had just given to
congressional leaders about the administration 's intention to ask for
another large installment of money
for the Nicaraguan contras sometime in the near future, or at least
by November 7. (The Administration has since postponed its request
until at least the beginning of the
new year.)
When questioned about whether
or not such a request indicated the
administration's lack of faith in the
Arias peace plan and the ensuing
talks, Shultz said that he didn't

Gail McGrew Eifrig teaches English
at Valparaiso University.

think it indicated that at all. It was,
he said, a matter of having some
cards to play when you sat down to
the table. We had to have these
cards, he said, or we couldn't play.
My mind is active on the subject
of metaphor; I teach it all the time,
of course, but I am struck with its
increasing prevalence in the realm
of political and governmental
rhetoric. Sometimes it seems to
emanate from the media, and
sometimes from individual figures,
but it is striking how much of it has
come into being lately. How often
and glibly aren't people now using
the "smoking gun" for instance? Of
course, politicians are always accusing someone of doing an "end
run," and delivering the "knockout
punch."
On the same issue of the increased contra aid, some administration official quoted in the press
said that the figure of 250 million
was not just a "highball" which
could be negotiated, but a firm
number. I did not understand this
one at all, since I could not figure
out what a bourbon and soda had
to do with the supplying of arms to
a group of foreign rebels, but I
have to assume that the man who
made the statement had some sort
of meaning in mind.
The problems of metaphor are
manifold, of course. One sacrifices
exactness and precision for suggestion, for emphasis, for a direct,
often emotional appeal to the
hearer's association with the term
in another context. "Smoking gun,"
which presumably means a piece of
evidence so direct as to be irrefutable evidence of guilt, has connotations of cowboys shooting it out on
the main street, or maybe of Sam
Spade throwing open the door of
the sleazy apartment to confront
the murderer with no chance of escape. Among other things, the
term thus brings to mind the inevitable simplification of guilt and
innocence that we associate with
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most crime or western fiction. That
simplification is, of course, why we
like such terms. But they may not
be the best ways in which to try to
understand national or international affairs.
Back to George Shultz's effort.
Since I cannot imagine that he is
talking about greeting cards, or
bingo cards, or baseball cards, I
suppose he means playing cards.
And probably, being a manly type,
he means poker. Now he also said
this in his formal remarks to the
congressmen: "It is simply not in
our interest to leave the Sandinista
regime unconstrained by credible
resistance forces on the basis of a
hope or promise. We have too
much at stake."
This formulation, which was
quoted in the Chicago Sun-Times, allows me to ask carefully about what
he means by having something at
stake. What do we have at stake?
What is "our interest" in the area,
that must constrain the Nicaraguan
government? How "credible" are
the contras? Why are not the
"promises" of a duly constituted
government a sufficient reason for
our country to stop putting military
pressure on that government? His
sentence does allow for discourse,
for questions, for clarifications to
be made, for nuances of meaning
to be explored. But his use of the
metaphor, "we have to have cards
if we're going to sit at the table and
play," is an unhelpful, obfuscating,
unmeaningful expression.
Or is it? One of the uses of
metaphor is to allow us to explore
what is really meant, underneath
and along with what is apparently
meant. So when I hear our Secretary of State describe our participation in the peace process in Central
America in terms of playing poker,
I have to pay close attention. It
struck me as I listened to him make
this comment that his view of
"peace talks" and mine are very
d ifferent.
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He wants to "hold cards" so that,
presumably, he can win. Winning is
the point of playing poker, I guess.
Of course, in poker games, part of
the object is the camaraderie, the
beer and sandwiches, the cigar
smoke and so on . (My information
here only comes from Matthau and
Lemmon in The Odd Couple.) But I
don't imagine that this sociability is
part of Shultz's use of the
metaphor. I assume that he uses
the game metaphor because he
means that when he goes to the
table, he wants to win.
It made me wonder, I confess,
what would happen with the
feminization of political power in
this country? I assume that Jeane
Kirkpatrick might be perfectly
happy with the poker image, but
what about other types? Can you
imagine a Secretary of State announcing to the press that she
wanted such and such a policy to
be put into effect so that when the
time came to put the quilt together,
we would have our blocks ready to
bring to the bee? No, I can't either.
Yet the construction of a quilt,
where everybody contributes some
time, some talent, some individuality, and works together to produce
a useful and satisfying object might

be a good image for a peace
negotiation. Since it is a process in
which the end result must be a
community in which all needs have
been met to some degree, can we
be justified in thinking of it in
terms of winning and losing? The
image of game, particularly when
game means winning and losing,
just does not indicate a frame of
mind that seems right for the difficult, tedious, painstaking, meticulous process of making a peace
within a country suffering from
civil war.
While Shultz is thinking in terms
of his strategy for game-playing, we
have to face the perceptive comments of a person li ke Donald Castillo, speaking to New York Times
writer James LeMoyne. In his piece
from 4 October, LeMoyne quotes
Castillo, formerly a Sandinista and
now a spokesman for the contras,
saying this to Americans: "You
have been generous to us-and you
have also utilized us and manipulated us as part of your domestic
political agenda . ... But have you
been aware that you're playing with
the life and blood of a people and
a country?"
What are we playing at in Central America?
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Film & the Novel
Edward Byrne
The narrative potential of film is so
marked that it has developed its
strongest bond with the novel, not with
painting, not even with drama.
-James Monaco

In a recent issue of the New York
Times, John Updike, on the occasion of the release of a movie based
upon his novel , The Witches of
Eastwick, has resurrected everrecurring questions about the relative values of books and films,
about the influence films command
over readers of novels, and about
the relationship the serious writer
has held with Hollywood.
Somewhat grudgingly, Updike
begins his article by declaring that
"movie makers, like creative spirits
everywhere, must be free; they owe
nothing to the authors of books
they adapt except the money they
have agreed to pay them ." However, his article continues on to
proclaim that these filmmakers , despite their best intentions, are creative spirits producing works destined to belong to a lesser art form,
an art form for which one must

Edward Byrne, a new contributor,
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Film courses at the University of Utah
and served as film critic for two newspapers in Salt Lake City.
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entertain only diminished expectations due, if for no other reason, to
the various obstacles presented by
the unique characteristics of the
medium : "They bring their visions
through a welter of props and
egos, actors and bankers, that a
mere wordmonger would be overwhelmed by." Updike concludes
that today's films, especially, pandering to the tastes of their predominantly youthful audience, "are
inexorably juvenile." Although, in a
hollow afterthought, Updike does
suggest that perhaps the movies always were juvenile, but he "was too
juvenile to notice."
I. Film as Literature

Cinema, for me, is an act of prose.
-Francois Truffaut

The questions John Updike
raises about film and literature are
not new. Ever since the first narrative films began to gain widespread
acceptance by the American public
at the start of World War I, there
has been discussion concerning the
position film-making should assume among the arts, particularly
in relation to the novel. The increasingly sophisticated storytelling
brought to the screen by D. W.
Griffith, Sergei Eisenstein, and
others by the mid-1920s intensified
such discussion. However, it was
the success of 1927's The Jazz
Singer, the first full-length narrative
with sound, and the introduction of
Lights of New York (1928), the first
all-talking feature film, which initiated what eventually evolved into
a full-scale debate over the legitimacy of film as a competitor to the
novel.
Nevertheless, through to the
1950s filmmakers occupied the lowest levels of respectability among
the opinions of literary reviewers,
art critics, and academics. One
main characteristic of film still
separated it from the other more

acceptable arts, particularly the
narrative forms of literature. A
novel, despite any assistance contributed by an editor, or even a play,
curiously enough, regardless of its
many production similarities to
film , was indisputably the product
of an author: the movies were seen
as results of a collaborative effort
only.
This final (or so it seemed at the
time) roadblock to respectability
was removed in the 1950s by a collective of young French filmwriters
and journalists (including Alexandre Astruc, Claude Chabrol, JeanLuc Godard, Jacques Rivette, Eric
Rohmer, and Francois Truffaut)
who contributed articles to the
magazine Cahiers du Cinema and
later, as directors of their own films,
became associated with the French
New Wave. Together, they introduced the politique des auteurs, declaring that talented directors, though
they may not always exercise total
control over their films, certainly can
demonstrate an ability to stamp their
films with a cinematic style, a personal signature, much the way an accomplished novelist displays a clearly
identifiable prose style. This camera
style, labelled mise en scene, "placing
on the stage," became for directors,
as Alexandre Astruc described it,
"no longer a means of illustrating or
presenting a scene, but a true act of
writing," a visual literature.

Until the '50s filmmakers
occupied the lowest
levels of respectability
among the opinions of
literary reviewers, art
criti cs, and academics.
One of the directors who had
exhibited just such an individual,
distinguishable cinematic style, and
whose cause was central to their argument, and, therefore, was cham27

pioned by these Fre nch students of
film, was Alfred Hitchcock. With
the advantage of hindsight, it is difficult to understand the nonacceptance of Hitchcock as a great
film-maker. However, until the
early 1960s Hitchcock's works were
viewed with amusement by most
critics, but rarely, if ever, taken
seriously. As Truffaut states in the
preface to his well-known extended
interviews
of the
filmmaker,
"American and European critics
made him pay for his commercial
success by reviewing his work with
condescension, and by belittling
each new film ."
With Hitchcock as their most visible example, Truffaut and his colleagues were determined to right
this injustice and to end any doubt
as to the credibility of film as a
serious art form. As the auteur
theory gradually solidified its position among members of the European film community and gathered
support from American cnucs,
most notably Andrew Sarris, who
expanded its definition in 1962, the
reputations of many directors
whose decades of artistic contributions to cinema had previously
been overlooked suddenly benefitted. In addition to Hitchcock, John
Ford,
Howard
Hawks,
Frank
Capra, and other American directors whose contributions had been
taken for granted in critics' reviews
of their films, directors who had
been seen merely as cogs in the
Hollywood studio machinery, were
now finding themselves subjects of
the critics' adjusted re-viewings, and
their careers as filmmakers reevaluated, their status elevated
from supervision to craftsman to
auteur. As Truffaut correctly concluded, the recognition of directors
as the "a uthors" of their films, with
all the implications of sole responsibility, of individual vision, of artistry which the title bestows, was the
beginning of "the premise that
onema is an art form , on a par
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with literature."
Undoubtedly, critics' acceptance
of this correction in the proper relationship between the director's
role in the creation of a film and
the esteem he deserved forced
studios to conform to new conditions. The recommendation that
the directors of serious films be regarded with the same respect reserved for the authors of important
novels resulted in a realignment of
power in Hollywood. This adjustment, causing greater economic
and creative leverage in the relationship between the directors
and the studios, as well as the
newly-won acquisition of a larger
share of control by directors over
film production activities, became
visible to the public only in the
more prominent positioning of directors on the list of credits and the
heightening of directors' names
above the titles of films on the marquees of movie theatres.

Over the past 25 years
American directors have
reaped the rewards
accompanying an enhanced
recognition of their value
in the making of films
and their role as artists.
To average moviegoers this sma ll
shift in the appearance of authority
might not have gone unnoticed ,
but might have seemed somewhat
insignificant; nevertheless, it signalled the beginning to a new era of
film-making. Although the Hollywood executives had not abdicated total control over the production of their movies, this minor
transfer of power had a more subtle, more lasting effect on the
studios, whose strength had already
been eroded by postwar antitrust
laws, the mistrust of the film industry caused by the hearings held by

the House Committee on UnAmerican
Activities,
and
the
paranoid over-reaction of studio
heads who, entrusting more power
to accountants, enacted hasty, unwise economic cutbacks and ended
many exclusive contracts with actors or directors as cost-cutting
measures in response to a perceived competition represented by
the ever-increasing presence of
television sets in the living rooms of
America as the 1950s drew to a
close.
Over the past 25 years American
directors have reaped the rewards
accompanying an enhanced recognition of their value in the production of films and of their roles as
creative artists. Woody Allen, Francis Ford Coppola, Brian DePalma,
Lawrence Kasdan, George Lucas,
Martin Scorcese, and Steven Spielberg are among the many American directors who have come to
power in an atmosphere made
more inviting by two decades which
have witnessed the influence of and
adherence to the auteur theory.
In addition to critical and popular recognition, in the last 25 years
have
individuals in academia
started to acknowledge a place for
film within the walls of our institutions of higher learning. However,
although almost all universities
have added film courses to their
curricula-as a separate department or as a part of commu nication, theatre, or English-and despite the fact that some of our leading directors are excellent examples
of students produced by the film
schools which do exist, much reluctance to total acceptance of fi lms as
works of literature and to a serious
consideration of film studies equal
to that accredited to other disciplines continues in the conservative
environment of the college.
One of the many flaws in The
Closing of the American Mind, the
current best-seller by Professor
Allan Bloom of the University of
The Cresset

Chicago, is the depreciatory manner in which he depicts films as the
antithesis of good books. Bloom declares: "Lack of education simply
results in students' seeking for enlightenment wherever it is readily
available, without being able to distinguish between the sublime and
trash, insight and propaganda. For
the most part students turn to the
movies . . . . The distance from the
contemporary and its high seriousness that students most need in
order to discover what is most serious about themselves cannot be
found in the cinema, which now
knows only the present." This view
of the movies merely as escapist entertainment, the novel as a medium
for
equcational enlightenment,
exemplifies an unwavering, elitist
attitude toward films which remains today in many of our
educators, promoting a schism that
values one art form over another
and is born of snobbishness.
A further academic argument
supporting the superiority of books
over films on the basis of a characteristic of temporality thought inherent to film is proposed in the
aforementioned article by John Updike in the New York Times. As he
develops his discussion of the reand
lationship between films
novels, Updike concedes the possibility of a director as author of a
film, but he elaborates upon distinctions he believes exist between
the two forms of narrative. Updike
writes: "The text is almost infinitely
patient, snugly gathering its dust
on the shelf; until the continental
drift of language turns its English
as obscure as Chaucer's, the text remains readily recoverable and potentially as alive as on the day it
was scribbled. Not so film: its
chemicals fester in the can, it grows
brittle and brown, its Technicolor
bleaches, it needs a projector and a
screen, it is scratched and pocked
and truncated by the wear and tear
of its previous projections." It is
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surprising, and somewhat puzzling,
to discover this new point of debate
against consideration of films as
serious, lasting works of literature
on a par with novels, especially
with the growing number of videotapes available to all. The innovation of the videocassette recorder
and the coming blossoming of library holdings of movies on videocassette have opened up, for the
first time, an entire inventory of
films, making a movie as accessible
to the average viewer as books have
been in the past.

John Updike concedes the
possibility of a director
as author of a film,
but he elaborates upon
distinctions he believes
exist between the two
forms of narrative.
In fact, the similarity in size, and
sometimes cost, between a boxed
videocassette and a hard-cover
novel may be coincidental, but
more and more Americans are beginning to stock videocassettes on
their bookshelves beside their
novels. The film studios have taken
notice: MGM/UA has acknowledged an awareness of this acceptance on the part of the American
public and has launched an advertising campaign for its "classic
novels on film" series to take advantage of this change in perception. Although these films may not
substitute for the great works from
which they have been adapted, the
series does reinforce the equivalence of films and novels, and it
paves the way for affirmation of
new films as serious works of art,
as narratives which share a parity
with the novel.
This attitude of respect toward
filmmakers and their works can be
detected in the encroachment of

terms normally associated with
literary criticism into the language
emerging alongside auteur to accommodate the adoption of film as
another of our literary forms. In
his assessment of one of the effects
videocassettes have exerted on the
film industry, director John Sayles
states a further parallel between
publishing and film-making: "I see
first-run theaters as becoming the
'loss leader' for the VCR, like hardcover books for the paperback industry." Libraries which have demonstrated prudent foresight by
obtaining larger holdings of videocassettes are experiencing increased memberships and greater
usage.
Some cinema academics are contributing to the recognition of film
as a literary form by using texts
such as James Monaco's How to
Read a Film in their classes. In his
text, Monaco even points out an inverse influence film has held over
the shape of the contemporary
novel: "Novelists have learned to
narrate their stories in the smaller
units common to film. Like contemporary playwrights, they think
now more often in scenes rather
than in more elaborate acts." In addition, one of the advantages offered by the videocassette recorder
is that its rewind feature allows the
viewer to easily go back and "reread" a section of the film as one
might return to a chapter of a
novel, or to isolate an important
scene as one might highlight a
prominent passage in a book.
For years, "Film and Literature"
courses have wedged their way into
the college curriculum wherever
room could be found for them, an
indication that film might be an art
form to consider more seriouslybut only as an adjunct to literature.
Perhaps the time has finally arrived
to teach "Film as Literature" and
acknowledge this narrative form's
true relation to the novel.
~~
[Part 1 of a Series]
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Faith-Full
Opinions
Thomas A. Droege

Second Opinion:
Health~ Faith~ and
Ethics
The Park Ridge Center. Three
Issues per Year. $35.00.

Second Opinion is called by its
creators "a book-like journal and a
journal-like book" because it has
characteristics of each. This new
publication venture is now over a
year old, three volumes having
been produced , and its unique perspective and format deserve a review.
Second Opinion is but one piece in
an ambitious program of publication by The Park Ridge Center
(1875 Dempster St., Suite 175, Park
Ridge, IL 60068) called Project
Ten, so named because the project
is designed to explore ten basic issues within ten different faith traditions. Six volumes have been
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published (Crossword) m the
Health/Medicine and the Faith traditions series, each of them dealing
with the following concepts within
a particular faith tradition : wellbeing, sexuality, passages, morality,
dignity, justice, sickness and madness, healing and caring, suffering,
and dying. Another recent product
of the Center's research program is
the publication of Caring and Curing (Macmillan, 1986), which contains twenty essays on the major
denominational groupings of the
traditional Western faiths, each reviewing the relationship between
medicine and faith within a particular tradition .
Second Opinion fits within the
(larger) framework of Project Ten ,
though its essays do not focus so
much on particular faith traditions
or the particular concepts that
serve as organizational categories in
the publications noted above.
Rather, Second Opinion "stimulates
interdisciplinary conversations between members of fie lds relating to
health, faith, and ethics." Each volume has a particular topical focus
(Organ Transplants, The Neonatal
Intensive Care Unit, Stigma and
Illness) within the fie ld of bioethics.
I find two things that are unique
about the contents of this "booklike journal." One is that the perspective of faith is consistently represented in all of the essays in the
three volumes published thus far.
Bioethics is at present a secular discipline dominated by the perspectives of medicine, philosophy, and
law. Occasionally one will find essays in periodicals and anthologies
by theological ethicists like Paul
Ramsey and Richard McCormick,
but they are rare and usually do
not represent the distinctiveness of
particu lar faith traditions. Second
Opinion is a welcome corrective to
this secular bias, and long overdue.
Another unique characteristic of
the approach of Second Opinion is
its emphasis on clinical ethics. Case

studies have always been a part of
bioethics, but o~ly as a point of departure for reasoning on the basis
of ethical theories and principles.
Second Opinion consistently lifts up
the human dimension of the problems being considered, e.g. the victims of AIDS or the parents of infants in neonatal intensive care. It
is, I think, the wisdom of faith
which highlights the human dimension and shows its importance for
serious ethical reflection .
It is not possible to review the
contents of all three volumes. What
I offer instead is a review of the
second volume, which has as its
focus the Neonatal Intensive Care
Unit. This is the best of the volumes in my judgment, partly because it provides a much more sustained focus on one problem area,
and partly because it provides
ready examples of the particular
strengths of Second Opinion already
mentioned.

One unique feature of

Second Opinion is that
the perspective of faith
is consistently
represented in all of the
essays in the volumes
published thus far.
The first 90 of the 150 pages of
Volume Two are devoted to the
focus on neonatal intensive care.
The human dimension referred to
above comes through in a variety
of ways. First, there are three pictorial essays which give the reader an
inside look at a neonatal intensive
care unit. Second, a case study provides the basis for reflections by
two theologians (Roman Catholic
and Protestant) and a clinical ethicist. Third, a father's journal on
the experience of 77 days of his infant's neonatal care is included. All
of these factors force the reader to
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reflect on ethical problems within
the rich diversity of human experience. That is the strength of clinical ethics, which is the subject of an
interesting interview with Dr. Mark
Siegler in Volume 3.
Including so much material on
the human dimension of neonatal
intensive care enables the reader to
discover some of the problems of
modern medical care that might
otherwise be overlooked. In commenting on the case study, Richard
McCormick notes how completely
the family is left out of the care of
their imperiled infant, both in the
decisions made and in the care provided. The parents were passive
and helpless participants m a
drama where they were swept
along by events over which they
had no control. In fact, any decision that they might make to stop
the massive technological support
system that immediately goes into
effect when there is an imperiled
life was subject to quick reversal by
court order.
One gains the same sense of passive helplessnesss in reading "77
Days: A Father's Journal." The
father is an outside observer of a
drama in which one would think he
should be a central character. He is
told that he will be able to hold the
baby when the infant reaches the
weight of three pounds, and he
poignantly but passively waits for
that great moment when he will
have some involvement in what is
happening to his child. What is it
about three pounds that makes it a
safe limit for holding and who
makes that decision? At the end of
three weeks the father is amazed to
find that $34,000 has been spent in
the care of his child. "My God. We
expected it to be expensive, but
that's hard to believe." The parents
are passive participants in a drama
where they play no part-except,
of course, to make sure that the bill
is paid.
The other unique characteristic
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of Second Opinion is also well represented in this second volume,
and that is the perspective of faith
that is brought to every issue under
consideration. Richard McCormick,
a well-known Roman Catholic commentator on bioethical issues, and
Karen Lebacqz, a Protestant Christian ethicist, offer commentary on
the case study from their own
unique theological perspectives.
The two commentaries show a
marked difference in theological
the
carefully
style
between
reasoned approach of McCormick,
so typical of the natural law tradition from which he comes, and the
"story theology" of Lebacqz, who
likens the parent's experience in the
NICU to the Israelite wilderness
experience in the Old Testament.
Theologians are used as commentators on case study in other journals on bioethics, but this is the
first such case study that I've read
where one has the opportunity to
compare commentaries of two very
different theological perspectives.

The parents in the case
were passive and
helpless participants in
a drama where they
were swept along by
events over which they
had no control.

The religious perspective is also
prominent in all of the other essays
in this volume. Robert Weir, Professor of Religious Studies at Oklahoma State University, has written an excellent essay on when it is
justifiable not to treat. The interview essay (a regular feature of Second Opinion) with Joseph A.
Califano, Jr. on the revolution in
American health care contains an
interesting section on the role of
religion. This volume also contains

a brilliant essay by Langdon Gilkey
on "Dimensions of Basic Faith and
the Special Traditions," in which
Gilkey shows the interconnections
between a generic or universal faith
and the way faith is shaped by special traditions, including the tradition of medicine. This essay is the
finest example in all three of the
volumes of the kind of thoughtful
reflection that Second Opinion is trying to promote in exploring the
many-faceted interaction between
the areas of health, faith, and ethics.
The format of Second Opinion is
also unique. Describing it as a
"book-like journal" is apt. It is designed to fit easily on any ordinary
bookshelf, making it handy for reference. It might be called a "slick"
publication-glossy
pages
and
cover, an abundant use of illustrations, color-coded volumes. It is expensive ($35 for three issues) if one
compares it to the cost of other
journals. The glossy pages are indeed glossy, and that makes reading difficult unless the light source
is somewhat diffused.
The Park Ridge Center is to be
commended for its publication of
this journal, as well as all of the
other ventures of Project Ten. Second Opinion offers what I would call
a different level of conversation to
those who are interested in questions of health care and bioethics.
What makes the conversation different is that those who represent
the faith traditionls are regarded as
equal conversation partners. The
result is both a deepening and a
broadening of the conversation.
I recommend this journal to
those who are as impatient as I
often am with the secularity and
limited focus of so much of the literature in bioethics and health
care. If this first year of publication
is an example of what is to come,
we can look forward to richly textured discussions of issues that are
at the forefront of public interest
and concern.

c:
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'Twas the Night
Before Christmas
Dot Nuechterlein
Do you believe in the myth of
Santa Claus? No, silly, I am not
asking if you personally are convinced that a jolly large person with
a red suit and a white beard riding
an airborne sleigh pulled by eight
(nine with Rudolph) reindeer
climbs down the chimney at midnight on Dec. 24th and leaves presents for all obedient little boys and
girls.
But do you believe in the myth ?
Do you go along with that story
about S. Claus/Kris Kringle/Father
Christmas/etc. for the supposed
benefit of the small fry who haven't
yet turned skeptical about everything? Do you carry out the conspiracy with either your own or
other people's kids? Do you get a
warm, fuzzy feeling just thinking
about it, knowing that Christmas
wouldn't be the same if it weren 't
for the old Ho Ho Ho-er himself?
I can't remember ever believing
in Santa Claus, man or myth . For
starters, I was brought up in a family that celebrated Christmas on
Christmas Eve, and it was pretty
hard to square our after-thechi ldren 's-Ch ristmas- Eve-serviceand-family-devotions-gift-exchangeand-getting-up-early-to-go-to-churchagain-on-Christmas-morning with
the cultural picture of a bare tree
the night before and a load of
packages under it the next day. It
just didn't figure . So Christmas was
to celebrate the Birth of Christ,
and only shepherds and angels and
wise men were allowed.
By the way, when my classes discuss the difficulties of marriage I
warn students that the typical ob-
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stacles to marital bliss-money, inlaws, sex-are sometimes less difficult to overcome than a difference in family traditions. Effort
and logical compromise can help
you make reasonable decisions
about prioritizing spending, for
example; but customs and practices
handed down through the ages become part of your self identity, not
easily altered or sacrificed, no matter how much you love your mate.
Lucky for me I married a fellow
who shared my heritage, and agreed to pass it along to our children. So they didn't learn the Santa
stuff, either. Oh, to be sure, they
picked up the story from TV and
playmates and stores and such. But
we made sure they knew it was all
make believe, okay to pretend
about, but not to take seriously.
Christmas, we would say, is because
God loved us enough to send Jesus,
and presents are because we love
one another.
(I might add that we don't follow
the culture in a number of ways.
No one in the bunch is particularly
crazy about turkey, so I have never
roasted one. We usually vote on the
choice of Christmas dinner: last
year we had "traditional lasagna"
and the year before I think it was
beef bourguignonne.
(We also don't put up our tree or
decorate the house until right before the 25th, so that we can pay
better attention to Advent. The
children have always hated that,
especially since it means most trees
have been sold weeks before and
only scrawny or misshapen ones
a re available. Every year it's a matter of axing the stump end to make
it fit the holder-<:amplete with
some non-Christmas-type vocabulary-and often the poor thing remains upright only because of
wires attached to the wall.
(Then we leave the rapidly-defoliating bush up until Epiphany,
which also strikes some as a quaint

observance; I remember the time
our tree didn't go up until the
night of the 23rd and the people
down the street pitched theirs on
the afternoon of the 25th. Plus we
once had neighbors who noticed
ours was the on ly house on the
block lacking a gaudy d isplay beginning in about mid-November,
and they wondered if we were
Jewish.)
A certain amount of mythology is
good for a society, but I haven't yet
determined whether the Santa
myth is helpfu l or hurtful. True,
I've never run into anyone whose
life was bent out of shape because
of an early faith, with its concomitant disillusionment. If that happens, we don't hear about it.
Yet the fable is so pervasive, so
woven into the fabric of our everyday life, that it makes me uneasy.
I How can any ultimate good come
from such a monstrous falsehood?
It is probably ridiculous to link the
demythologized Santa with the fact
that American kids get suspicious
and cynical and worldly wise at
such an early age these days, but I
can't help wondering if that doesn't
play at least a part.
Well, it really doesn't matter
what I think. The old boy has been
around for a long time, in a
number of guises in various countries, and there's no sign of a let
up. I am curious, however, to see
what will happen in the next generation . If I have grandchildren
someday, will their parents stick to
family tradition, or will they follow
the general culture?
Chances are if my kids marry
they will find partners who were
brought up with the folkways of
the majority, so I'm prepared for
the worst. But here's one granny
who will never be able to read
aloud that "beloved" Christmas
poem with much conviction. Sorry
about that.
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